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ABSTRACT 
The study examined whether: share repurchase events and changes in dividends 
were good predictors of future changes in earnings. The research also investigated 
how the South African market reacted to share repurchase events in the short-run. 
Using INET BFA, data for 226 dividend paying companies and 55 share 
repurchasing companies, trading on the JSE during the period 2003 to 2013, was 
collected.  
 
 
Dividend theory suggests that changes in dividends convey information content 
about the future earnings of the firm. After testing this theory, limited support was 
found for this notion. Firms that had increased dividends at (T0) showed significant 
earnings increases in that year. Nonetheless, some of the dividend increasing firms 
showed no subsequent unexpected earnings growth at (T1) and (T2). While the size 
of the dividend increase had a strong positive relationship with current earnings; it 
failed to predict future earnings with any consistency. Firms that had cut dividends at 
(T0) experienced a reduction in earnings in that year but showed increases in 
earnings at (T1). However, consistent with Lintner‘s (1956) model on dividend policy, 
firms that had increased their dividends were less likely to experience a reduction in 
earnings, as opposed to the no-change or dividend decrease groups.  
 
 
A linear regression model was employed in testing whether share repurchases were 
useful in predicting changes in future earnings.  According to the results reported in 
the regression model, share repurchases are a good predictor of future changes in 
earnings. The study at hand then went on to explore how the South African market 
reacted to share repurchases. Through the utilisation of the Market Model-Event 
Study Methodology (with an event window of 41 days, 20 days prior and 20 days 
post the event), the findings of the report indicated that the South African market 
reacted positively to share repurchases. This was evidenced through positive: share 
price returns, abnormal returns and average abnormal returns, post the event. 
Nonetheless, cumulative average abnormal returns remained negative in the short-
run. In addition, the results showed that firms engage in share repurchase activities 
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in order to signal that the stock is undervalued. There was an observable trend of 
declining share prices before the share repurchase event. 
 
 
A few recommendations were proposed following the results obtained. Dividends are 
unable to predict changes in earnings. Therefore, a dividend cut, is not an indication 
that a company‘s earnings will decrease in the future or that the managers of that 
company foresee a decline in future earnings. From a share repurchase point of 
view, managers of JSE listed companies should not only focus on the short-term 
benefits of share repurchase events. These benefits are generally short lived as 
shares do return to their falling state, however authors such as Wesson, Muller and 
Ward (2014) have shown that the benefits of share repurchase events can also be 
observed in the long- run, A further point to note for both investors and managers of 
JSE listed companies is that share repurchases are a good predictor of future 
earnings. Therefore, it is very confusing for investors when a company announces a 
share repurchase event but does not follow through with it.  
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CHAPTER 1 
1. BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
Dividend policy has been studied extensively, over the past years. The seminal work 
of Miller and Modigliani (1961) gave birth to a broad body of literature dealing with 
and examining the pay-out policies of firms in the United States and elsewhere in the 
world. The term ‗dividend policy‘ refers to the practice that management follows in 
making dividend pay-out decisions, in other words, the size and pattern of cash 
distributions over time to shareholders (Lease, John, Kalay, Loewenstein & Sarig, 
2000). Interestingly, dividend policy remains one of the most contested topics in 
finance. In particular, the question of whether dividend changes reveal information 
about future or past earnings and profitability has been described as one of the most 
controversial subjects in corporate finance (Grullon, Michaely, Benartzi & Thaler, 
2005). Lintner (1956) holds that dividend increases convey information about future 
earnings. On the other hand Bernartzi, Michaely and Thaler (1997) and Wolff and 
Auret (2009) maintain that alterations in dividend policy are a reflection of past 
events. This question remains highly contested and unanswered. 
 
 
In addition to the aforementioned, new research conducted by Viviers, Firer and 
Muller (2013), shows that the number of South African companies paying dividends 
has decreased substantially over the past few years. The findings of these authors 
are in line with that of Fama and French (2001), who provide evidence that the 
number of listed firms paying cash dividends in the United States has declined 
dramatically. These authors show that the proportion of firms paying cash dividends 
has fallen from 66.5% in 1978 to 20.8% in 1999. Although this decline is due in part 
to changes in the characteristics of firms that are publicly traded (i.e., more firms 
exhibit characteristics similar to those of non-dividend paying firms) the results show 
that, even after controlling for these characteristics there is a significant decline in 
the residual propensity to pay dividends. Several explanations have been offered as 
to the reason(s) for a declining propensity of firms to pay dividends. Most arguments 
have focused on the possibility that improved corporate governance has reduced the 
need for dividends as a mechanism to control the agency problems of free cash 
flows. Furthermore, the increasing occurrence of share repurchases, the decline in 
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the information content value of dividends, the observed lower transaction cost for 
consumption-initiated sale of shares owned and the catering theory, are among the 
other explanations that have been offered by researchers (Bildik & Fatemi, 2009). 
Grullon and Michaely (2002) suggest that there is evidence which indicates that 
share repurchases serve as substitutes for dividends.  
 
 
One of the most significant trends in corporate finance during the 1900s was the 
increasing popularity of open market share repurchases.  In the United States alone, 
the number of open market repurchases increased by 650%, between the year 1985 
to 1996 (Jagannathan, Stephens & Weisbach, 2000). Before exploring this topic in 
greater detail, it is important to have an understanding of what share repurchases 
entail. In an ordinary share repurchase, the repurchasing firm distributes cash to 
some of its shareholders and in exchange acquires a fraction of its outstanding 
equity. Generally, a cash repurchase of ordinary shares: changes the structure of 
assets held by the firm, alters the firm‘s financing mix, revises the ownership 
proportions of each of its shareholders and distributes cash to shareholders by 
means of a transaction that is taxed differently than an equivalent dollar amount 
distributed as a dividend (Dann, 1981). According to Persons (1997), repurchases 
have an advantage over other signals like: dividends, corporate philanthropy or 
advertising. In addition to the aforementioned, literature provides a lengthy list of 
motivations as to why companies repurchase their own shares, these include: capital 
structure adjustments, takeover defence, signalling, excess cash distribution, 
substitution for cash dividends and wealth expropriation from bondholders. 
Nonetheless, the traditional signalling theory, which is motivated by asymmetric 
information between the market place and the firm‘s managers, emerges as one of 
the most prevalent explanations for share repurchases. When managers were asked 
why they repurchase shares on the open market, the most commonly cited reasons 
were ‗undervaluation‘ and that their shares represented a ‗good investment‘, two 
reasons which are seemingly consistent with the signalling theory (Ikenberry, 
Lakonishok & Vermaelen, 1995). The paper written by Lintner (1956) indicates that 
firms are reluctant to cut dividends and experience negative share market reaction 
when they do. Repurchases, on the other hand, are more flexible and involve no 
such commitment or risk. Firms will sometimes announce share buy-back programs 
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but fail to repurchase any shares. In most instances, the market will not punish firms 
that perform these acts (Fried, 2001).  
 
  
1.1.  Problem Statement 
Dividend policy is one of the few areas in corporate finance to have been researched 
and analysed thoroughly, yet no consensus has been reached. According to Black 
(1976), the more one looks at the dividend picture the more it seems like a puzzle 
with pieces that just do not fit together. Academic literature is still not clear as to 
when and why companies pay out dividends. Furthermore in the instance when 
companies pay-out or cut dividends, what signal is being sent out about the future 
prospects of those companies?  
 
 
For decades researchers have maintained that the decision to pay-out dividends is 
important due to its signalling effect (Deeptee & Roshan, 2009). Linter (1956) 
maintains that managers only increase dividends when they are confident about the 
future earnings of the company and believe that their decision will not be reversed in 
the future. Rock and Miller (1985) state that dividend increases are a signal of good 
news; nonetheless there are dissipative costs involved. On the contrary, there lies a 
strong argument against dividend increases as they have led to reductions in 
earnings (Grullon et al., 2002). Furthermore Watts (1973), DeAngelo, DeAngelo and 
Skinner (1996), and Bernartzi, Michaely and Thaler (1997) find no evidence that 
dividend changes predict abnormal increases in earnings. From a South African 
perspective, the limited research conducted on this topic shows that there is a strong 
concurrent relationship found between dividend changes and earnings changes. 
However, none of the regression analyses indicates any evidence that dividends 
convey information content about future earnings (Wolff & Auret, 2009). The 
aforementioned is the point of departure for the study at hand. Therefore, the 
problem to be addressed by this study is whether current changes in dividends are a 
good predictor of future earnings, within the South African context. This investigation 
is particularly important as it covers the period post the global financial crisis and is 
thus an update of the paper written by Wolff and Auret (2009). Moreover the 
changes in corporate policies and practices warrant an investigation to be conducted 
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on the trend of dividend pay-outs in the South African market. Therefore, the 
question to be addressed here is whether South African companies are reducing 
dividend pay-outs or increasing them. 
 
  
Lintner (1956) concluded that dividends are sticky, tied to long-term sustainable 
earnings, paid by mature companies and smoothed from year to year. However, 
repurchases were virtually non-existent when Lintner (1956) and Miller and 
Modigliani (1961) wrote their papers. Over the past two decades, these corporate 
actions have grown in importance. In fact, several executives view share 
repurchases as being more flexible than dividends and use this flexibility in an 
attempt to time the market by accelerating repurchases when they believe their 
share price is low (Brav, Graham, Harvey & Michaely, 2005). From a South African 
perspective, companies were only allowed to repurchase their own shares as of the 
1st of July 1999 (Bester, Wesson & Hamman, 2010). Initially share repurchases 
started off slow due to uncertainty regarding the treatment of repurchases under tax 
laws, nonetheless once the tax implications had been clarified and companies 
became familiar with this new distribution mechanism, repurchase programmes were 
initiated by many JSE listed companies (Daly, 2002). From the period 2000 to 2003, 
Bhana (2007) reported 117 open market repurchase events. In a later study 
conducted by Bester (2008) it was found that 121 companies, listed on the JSE, had 
made 312 repurchase events from the period July 1999 to June 2007.  These 
growing numbers have raised some interesting questions on how the South African 
market reacts to actual share repurchase events from the period 2003 to 2013 and 
whether events of this nature are a good predictor of future earnings. In addressing 
these questions, this study seeks to contribute to the thin literature that is available 
on share repurchases in the South African market. 
 
 
1.2. Research Objectives: 
 to determine the relationship between dividend changes and future earnings 
 to determine the impact of actual share repurchases on share price 
performance 
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 to examine the South African market‘s reaction to actual share repurchase 
events   
 
 
1.3.  Delimitations 
 Due to time constraints, this study will only look at companies listed on the 
Johannesburg Securities Exchange (JSE). 
 The study is quantitative, as a result of this it lacks the human element 
provided by a qualitative study. Particularly with regard to investors‘ 
perceptions on dividend changes and share repurchases. 
 
 
1.4.  Importance and Benefits of the Proposed Research 
Decisions concerning equity cash flows (that is: dividends, share repurchases, and 
equity issues) have long been the focus of controversy and confusion among 
academics and financial practitioners (Asquith & Mullins, 1983). Dividends and share 
repurchases have always been perceived as vehicles for communicating information 
to shareholders. Nonetheless, they have always been viewed in isolation. While 
extensive research may have been conducted on share repurchases in the 
developed markets, there is very minimal research on share repurchases in 
emerging economies. In addition, most studies on repurchases in developing or 
emerging markets are exploratory in nature, with little focus on how the market 
reacts to repurchases. This may be as a result of share repurchases being a fairly 
new phenomenon in developing markets. From a South African context, share 
repurchases were only introduced in the year 1999 and have always been regulated 
differently to repurchases in developed markets. Very few South African researchers 
such as: Bhana (2007), Chivaka, Siddle, Bayne, Cairney, and Shev (2009), Wesson 
et al. (2014), and Wesson, Bruwer and Hammen (2015), have conducted 
investigations on this topic. As a result, the study at hand carries a lot of value from a 
South African perspective. It can be argued however that a lot of literature already 
exists on dividend policy. It can also be argued that corporate policies and practices 
are dynamic furthermore; economies go through cycles which influence the pay-out 
policy adopted by companies. Therefore the effect that changes in dividends have on 
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earnings, the changes in the propensity to pay dividends as well as the growing 
trend in the use of share repurchases in South Africa, warrants further scrutiny.  
 
 
The remainder of the research report will be structured as follows: Chapter 2 
provides a detailed overview of the current literature on dividends theory and 
investors‘ perceptions on dividend transformations. This chapter also provides a 
wide-range of literature on share repurchases (from an international and South 
African perspective). Chapter 3 consists of the methodology used, while Chapter 4 
discusses the results obtained. Lastly, Chapter 5 concludes the investigation. 
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CHAPTER 2 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section covers an extensive amount of literature on dividend pay-out policy. 
This includes an overview and synthesis of some important literature, chronicle 
changing perspectives and trends, stylized facts, practical implications, and 
suggestions for future research. Pieces of the dividend puzzle that have received 
empirical support are also identified and discussed. In addition to the 
aforementioned, the literature review takes an in-depth look at share repurchases. 
This includes the: reasons for share repurchases, the share price behaviour 
following share repurchase events, dividend and share buy-back decisions in the 
context of management pay-out decisions, financial benefits that share repurchases 
confer on corporates and shareholders, the impact of a change in the regulatory 
environment on share repurchases activity and the signalling effect of share 
repurchase events. While the information covered in the literature review may be 
inevitably incomplete, given the massive amount of literature available on dividends 
and share repurchases, there are detailed examinations of: theories and empirical 
evidence on individual studies. The distinctive contribution of this paper is that it 
synthesises the major conclusions based on theoretical and empirical findings from 
various authors.  
 
 
2.1. Miller and Modigliani Dividend Irrelevancy Theorem 
The Miller and Modigliani Theorem is the foundation of modern corporate finance. At 
the heart of this theorem is the belief that a firm‘s value is not affected by its financial 
decisions (Miller & Modigliani, 1961). In essence, the MM proposition is a collection 
of four assertions obtained from previous studies. According to this theorem a firm‘s 
market value is not affected by its debt-to-equity ratio, while a firm‘s leverage ratio 
has no effect on its weighted average cost of capital. Miller and Modigliani (1961) 
continue by stating that a firm‘s equity value is independent of its dividend policy and 
a firm‘s equity-holders are indifferent about the financial policy chosen. Nevertheless, 
it is important to note that the MM theorem requires a number of assumptions to be 
met before it can hold. These include the following: no taxes or brokerage fees, no 
capital market frictions, that is, no transaction costs, trade restrictions or bankruptcy 
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costs, symmetric access to credit markets and finally the idea that a firm‘s financial 
policy does not reveal any information .  
 
 
 The MM theorem, together with its stringent assumptions, has spurred a lot of 
debate in the academic sphere. Numerous attempts to overturn the theorem‘s 
controversial findings have been documented. According to Myers (2003), the 
presence of taxes alters the results of the MM theorem, since firms are able to make 
use of the debt tax shield. Therefore one may find companies accumulating more 
debt, instead of paying out dividends, so as to take advantage of the tax benefit. 
Miller and Modigliani (1961) further argue that investors are indifferent between 
dividends and share repurchases. However, if dividend taxes are higher relative to 
capital gains taxes, investors with high tax brackets will prefer shares with low 
dividend yields or share repurchases (Grullon et al., 2002). Thus, it can be stated 
that dividend policies are in fact affected by taxes. When shifting the focus to the 
costs of financial distress, which include: legal and administrative costs of 
bankruptcy, agency, moral hazard, monitoring and contracting costs, it becomes 
apparent that these overheads exists (Myers, 1984). If agency costs and moral 
hazard problems did not exist, there wouldn‘t be a reasonable explanation of debt 
covenants. A further argument posed against the MM theorem was presented by 
Donaldson (1961), who established that the majority of managers favoured the 
internal generation of funds as a source of new funds and when external funds were 
needed, issuing equity was rarely thought of. These results reaffirmed the pecking 
order hypothesis, which describes typical firm behaviour. According to this theory, 
firms initially prefer internal funding over external financing. Since dividends are 
sticky and cannot be changed in the short-run, dividend cuts are not used to finance 
capital expenditure. If a firm requires external funding, the safest security will be 
used first, which is, debt. As the need for external financing increases, the firm will 
issue equity as the very last option (Myers, 2001). The MM theorem (1961) supports 
the idea that dividends are irrelevant and have no effect on shareholder wealth. 
However this proposition seems to have a number of pitfalls, as some of the 
assumptions put forward do not hold in the real world. 
 
  
   
9 
 
2.2. Dividends are Relevant  
Increasing dividend payments, ceteris paribus, may be associated with increases in 
the firm‘s share, which later translates to firm value. In fact there is a long standing 
belief that dividends affect shareholder wealth and this is reflected in the intrinsic 
value of a firm‘s share. This characterisation of dividends and intrinsic value is 
consistent with the prevailing conventional wisdom of the early twentieth century. 
Williams (1938) developed a discounted cash flow (DCF) model depicting the 
intrinsic value of a firm‘s share as the present value of a growing stream of dividends 
during an era when investors expected that dividends would provide the largest 
proportion of their total return. Years later, Gordon (1959) published an updated 
version of the same model. The DCF model gained wide popularity among both 
academics and practitioners. This model is still used today.  
 
 
While the DCF model may be exceptional at depicting the intrinsic value of a firm‘s 
share, the question to ask here is why are increments in dividend payments 
associated with increases in the firm‘s share? In a world of uncertainty and imperfect 
information, dividends are valued differently to retained earnings (or capital gains). 
Since a higher current dividend reduces uncertainty about future cash flows, a high 
pay-out ratio will reduce the cost of capital, and hence increase share value 
(Malkawi, Rafferty & Pillai, 2010). According to Brigham, Gapenski and Ehrhardt 
(1999), the firm‘s optimum dividend policy must strike a balance between current 
dividends and future growth so as to maximise the share price. Empirical evidence 
shows that a dollar of dividends has, on average, four times the impact on share 
prices as a dollar of retained earnings (Graham & Dodd, 1934). Furthermore, the 
survey conducted Baker and Powell (1999) and Brav et al. (2005) confirms the 
results obtained in Lintner‘s (1956) paper managers believe dividends ought to be 
related to permanent rather than temporary increases in profits. This proposition is 
consistent with the notion that a fundamental relationship exists between dividends 
and firm value. In the study performed by Bulan and Hull (2013), it was observed that 
managers remained reluctant to cut dividends as this had severe consequences on 
the share price. Bulan (2010) even showed that for a given magnitude of the 
dividend cut, the three-day cumulative abnormal return around the dividend 
reduction was more negative for firms with less visible signs of poor performance 
   
10 
 
compared to those that have experienced a more prolonged period of poor 
performance. Therefore, if a firm cuts its dividend, investors will also discount the 
share price when there are no visible signs of financial distress that warrant the 
conservation of cash. Nevertheless, investors will be more forgiving of a dividend cut 
if they perceive that the cut is necessary for the firm‘s turnaround. DeAngelo, De 
Angelo and Skinner (1992) argue that a dividend reduction reflects a low level of 
current and expected future earnings of the firm, while Stepanyan (2009) states that 
dividend-cutting firms lack financial slack (excess cash or excess debt capacity). 
Given the evidence in the aforementioned, one can conclude that a dividend cut 
should not be much of a surprise to investors if managers cut the dividend as a last 
resort. 
 
 
Having looked at the evidence highlighting the relevance of dividends, it is important 
to note that dividend payment patterns of firms may be influenced by customs, 
beliefs, regulations, public opinions, perceptions and hysteria, general economic 
conditions and several other factors, all in perpetual change, impacting different firms 
differently (Barman, 2007). If a firm has overdue liabilities or is insolvent or bankrupt, 
the law will prohibit this company from paying out cash dividends. Furthermore, 
restrictive provisions in loan agreements constrain the firm‘s ability to pay dividends. 
Generally, these constraints prohibit payment of the cash dividends until a certain 
level of earnings has been achieved or limit dividends to certain dollar amount or 
percentage of earnings. Additional constraints may arise internally, where a firm‘s 
ability to pay cash dividends is reliant on the amount of liquid assets (cash and 
marketable securities) available. A large mature firm may have adequate access to 
funds, whereas a rapidly growing firm may rely heavily on internal financing to 
support acceptable projects. Therefore, it can be said that dividend payment patterns 
do not always give a true representation of a firm‘s financial standing. Dividend pay-
outs may be viewed as a factor affecting firm value; however investors should look at 
the broader picture. The reason behind a dividend cut is what matters. A firm‘s value 
should not be reduced because managers have decided to invest funds internally or 
in a project with a positive net present value, instead of increasing dividends. 
Companies may borrow funds, so as to increase dividends. This is not a true 
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reflection of the firm value and performance. Analysts need to examine dividend 
changes thoroughly and not assume that all dividend increases are good.  
 
 
2.3. Repurchases as an Element of Pay-out Policy 
Excess cash in a company may either be retained for on-going business operations, 
new investments, or paid out to shareholders in the form of dividends or share 
repurchases. In what way(s) is returning cash to shareholders via a share buy-back 
preferable to returning cash via a traditional dividend? Companies usually set a 
target dividend pay-out ratio (Baker and Smith, 2006; Baker, Veit and Powell, 2001; 
Marsh and Merton, 1986; Lintner, 1956), which is not changed unless a higher 
dividend can be sustained in future. Share repurchases on the other hand, are 
considered to be a much more flexible method of distributing excess cash to 
shareholders since they are financed from temporary cash flows (Bhargava, 2010; 
Brav et al., 2005). As a result, share repurchases are more susceptible to the current 
financial situation of a company and take place on an ad hoc basis. Where 
managers believe their companies are undervalued, they may use share 
repurchases to increase its share prices (Brav et al., 2005; Dittmar, 2000). Share 
repurchases are also used as a signalling instrument, to convey to the market that 
managers believe the company is undervalued (Wesson, 2015). It is not surprising 
that they have become an important financial tool for listed companies, globally. In 
the United States share repurchases by companies except financials and utilities 
listed on Compustat, equalled dividends for the first time in 1998, overtook dividends 
in 2005 and widened the margin significantly in 2006 (Dittmar, 2008). In Europe, 
share repurchases accounted for half of the total cash pay-outs in the year 2005 and 
show similar trends to those in the United States (Von Eije & Megginson, 2008). 
Bagwell and Shoven (1989) argue that the increase in repurchases indicates that 
firms have learned to substitute repurchases for dividends.  
 
 
2.4. Why would Companies choose Share Repurchases over Dividends? 
Over the past few years, share repurchases have grown in popularity. According to 
the paper written by Skinner (2008), share repurchases exceed dividends in the 
periods 2000, 2004 and 2005. One of the key differentiating factors between 
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dividends and share repurchases is the potential flexibility offered by the latter. 
Repurchases preserve financial flexibility relative to dividends because they do not 
implicitly commit the firm to future pay-outs. Some reports even state that there is a 
trend among managers to utilise share repurchases as a substitute for dividends, 
because they provide more flexibility. In the study conducted by Ikenberry et al. 
(1995) it was held that a share buy-back is not only a substitution of cash dividend, 
but also a more flexible technique of cash distribution because it is not a commitment 
of a future payment. Compared to dividend pay-outs which represents on-going 
commitment and are used by firms with higher continuous operating cash flow, share 
repurchases are often used when firms have high temporary non-operating cash 
flow. In the survey conducted by Brav et al. (2005), two-thirds of the managers 
interviewed stated that they were fond of the flexibility of share repurchases and 
disliked the rigidity of dividends because once a firm initiates a dividend it is 
expected to continue to pay dividends in the forthcoming periods. As a result of this, 
firms shy away from dividend initiations. Fama and French (2001) raise an 
interesting viewpoint that the percentage of firms paying cash dividends has 
diminished drastically therefore there is a decrease in the propensity to pay 
dividends as managers have become more inclined to buy back shares. This 
argument is supported by Jagannathan et al. (2000), who state that share 
repurchases have increased in prominence when compared to dividends. 
Interestingly Grullon and Michaely (2002) raise a similar argument nonetheless their 
analysis is slightly different. They maintain that large established firms have not 
decreased their dividend pay-outs however there is a higher propensity to pay-out 
cash through share repurchases.  
 
 
As mentioned in the earlier parts of this section, the flexibility inherent in repurchase 
programs is the main reason as to why they are utilised instead of dividends. 
Nonetheless, before one delves further into this topic, it is important to first 
understand the concept of financial flexibility (that is, the ability to avoid 
underinvestment as well as financial distress). There are two key components of 
financial flexibility the pay-out policy and risk management. The level and form of 
pay-out influence financial flexibility, therefore selecting lower pay-outs or more 
repurchases, relative to dividends, increases financial flexibility. Similarly, risk 
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management is fundamental to avoiding underinvestment and financial distress. 
Firms hedge to avoid raising costly external capital (Froot, Scharfstein & Stein 1993). 
In the paper written by Bonaime, Hankins and Harford (2013) it was established that 
both bank holding companies and nonfinancial firms recognize that pay-out policy 
and risk management both contribute to financial flexibility and are substitutes. 
However, hedging is costly, the direct cost being the price of the derivative 
instruments measuring and monitoring the underlying exposure and the indirect cost 
being the probability of forgoing some future cash flows in a good state economic 
environment. Therefore, if financial hedging and pay-out flexibility are substitutes and 
hedging is costly, firms should maintain full pay-out flexibility at all times unless doing 
so is also costly. Such pay-out flexibility implies that firms would need less active 
hedging and should not pay dividends.  
 
 
Paying lower dividends and repurchasing fewer shares while retaining cash and 
liquid assets can provide flexibility to firms in less stable markets, allowing them to 
react more aggressively to competitive threats when they do materialize (Hoberg, 
Phillips & Prabhala, 2012). Rapp, Schmid and Urban (2012) put forward an 
interesting argument relating to financial flexibility. Under their view, firms assigning 
a high value to financial flexibility are expected to limit or even avoid pay-outs at all 
costs. The rationale behind this notion is that, ceteris paribus, pay-outs reduce 
internal financing opportunities and raising external capital comes along with 
substantial costs, as mentioned by the likes of Myers and Majluf (1984). 
Furthermore, it is expected that pay-out decisions follow a pecking order according 
to which firms with a high value of financial flexibility are expected to prefer share 
repurchases to dividends when they decide to distribute earnings to their 
shareholders. This is in line with the view that dividends are often considered as an 
on-going commitment, while share repurchases can be omitted or reduced more 
easily (Guay & Harford, 2000).  
 
 
In the paper written by Iyer and Rao (2015), it was established that flexibility in a 
firm‘s pay-out policy can be organised into three types – operational, reactive, and 
timing. Operational flexibility refers to the ability of firms to decide whether to allocate 
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cash to shareholders or to keep it in the firm (e.g. for investments). Dividends and 
share repurchases may differ in their intrinsic operational flexibility. Introducing 
dividends may prohibit firms from investing in profitable ventures if reducing 
dividends are met with adverse market reaction. A firm that pays dividends is 
expected to pay (increase) the dividends in future or face hostile market reaction if it 
chooses to reduce dividends. Therefore, once a firm starts paying dividends it 
becomes constrained by its choice. This choice to pay dividends may prevent the 
firm from investing in profitable ventures or conserving cash for future needs. 
Fearing adverse market reaction the dividend paying firms might elect not to reduce 
dividends. Share repurchases may not suffer from this drawback. Reactive flexibility 
relates to the ability of repurchasers to evaluate the current and future environment, 
and alter an on-going open market share repurchase program based on the dynamic 
environment. A dividend once announced is rarely reversed. On the contrary, a 
share repurchase announcement is not a firm commitment. Firms can decide to 
delay or even suspend an on-going open market share repurchase program if the 
environment turns hostile.  
 
 
The final type of flexibility of share repurchases is the timing flexibility, which relates 
to the market timing of the actual open market repurchases. After announcing an 
open market share repurchase program the firm can decide to wait till the time is 
appropriate to repurchase shares. The managers may use their superior information 
on the intrinsic value of the firm and buy the stated amount of shares (or dollar value) 
when the market value of the shares drop below the intrinsic value of the firm. Snajdr 
(2009) supports this argument by stating that share repurchases are more flexible 
when it comes to time. Dividends are typically paid on a quarterly or annual basis, 
nonetheless share repurchases can be made in any moment in time, they take only 
several weeks and they give firms a better ability to increase their value when it is 
necessary. From the aforementioned it can be concluded that dividends constrain 
managers, therefore favouring a more flexible pay-out structure increases financial 
flexibility, thus allowing managers to utilise excess capital effectively (John & 
Knyazeva, 2009).  
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While it may be true that share repurchases afford managers with an extensive 
amount of flexibility, they also afford managers with the freedom to set up share 
repurchasing programs, irrespective of whatever intention they might have. 
Therefore, firms can and do initiate programs of any size even if they have no 
immediate intention of buying back shares. In fact, Ikenberry and Vermaelen (1996) 
provide a theoretical framework which suggests that most firms should be expected 
to continually have share buyback agreements in place, given their low-cost and 
flexibility. In such a world, one would expect these announcements to lose their 
signalling power (Chan et al., 2007). Up till now, the study has focused on the 
flexibility of share repurchases as a whole. However, over the past decade the 
frequency and dollar volume of accelerated share repurchases (ASRs) has 
exceeded that of privately negotiated repurchases, fixed-price self-tender offers, 
Dutch-auction self-tender offers, and large special dividends. In ASRs, a firm enters 
into a contract with an intermediary, typically an investment bank, whereby the 
intermediary immediately delivers a specified number of the firm‘s shares in 
exchange for cash based on an agreed upon price per share (ordinarily the most 
recent closing price). The intermediary obtains the shares that it delivers to the 
repurchasing firm by borrowing them, typically from institutions. The intermediary 
then covers its short position by purchasing shares in the market over a specified 
time period, normally several months. ASRs are credible commitments by firms to 
repurchase shares immediately. Nonetheless, including an ASR in a repurchase 
program reduces the flexibility that firms have to alter an announced program in 
response to subsequent changes in the liquidity and price of its share, firm 
conditions and so on (Bargeron, Kulchania & Thomas, 2010). Therefore, not all 
share buy backs offer the firm an extensive amount of financial flexibility.  
 
 
Jagannathan et al. (2000) find that firms with more volatile cash flows prefer more 
flexible share repurchases over dividends. This suggests that firms utilise share 
repurchases to distribute temporary profits and increase dividends only when they 
believe earnings have risen permanently. Therefore, despite the fact that share 
repurchases are more flexible than dividends, their future pay-outs are uncertain.  In 
addition to the above mentioned, Teng and Hachiya (2011) raise an interesting 
argument that in contrast to large firms which can easily attract relatively more 
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attention from investors than the small firms, the small firms are more likely to buy 
back more outstanding shares as a means of attracting attention from the market. 
Therefore, companies are not suddenly gravitating towards share buybacks because 
they are more flexible, share repurchases are often used as a mechanism for 
attracting attention to smaller firms. Grullon and Michaely (2002) confirm this 
hypothesis by stating that at the aggregate level younger firms have become more 
inclined to pay out cash in the form of share repurchases. Dhanani and Roberts 
(2009) maintain that while share repurchases may be more flexible, they are unlikely 
to replace dividends.  
 
 
Dividends still remain a major source of redistribution of cash flow and a primary 
pay-out vehicle. Fama and French (2001) show that generally, firms repurchasing 
shares are also dividend-paying firms. As a matter of fact, net share repurchases are 
larger and more prevalent among dividend payers. Therefore, share repurchases 
cannot substitute cash dividends. The findings obtained in the study conducted by 
Benhamouda and Watson (2010) supports the aforementioned. These results hold 
that British companies do not substitute dividends for share repurchases furthermore 
investors perceive cash dividends as being better than share repurchases. 
According to Ma (2012), investors generally accept dividend pay-outs as a credible 
signal, which indicates future profitability and stability. Managers pay attention to the 
dividend policy, dividends are not random over time and are far more frequent than 
share repurchases. In addition, investors also believe that managers intentionally 
choose a costly way of distributing surplus cash in order to convey favourable interior 
information. More importantly corporate managers and investors, who bestow a 
privilege upon dividend payments, hold the viewpoint that the disadvantage of the 
dividend can be offset by the increase in capital gains in signalling equilibrium. 
 
 
 The role of dividends has however led to a number of controversies that can be 
summarized in Black‘s (1976) famous dividend puzzle argument. The dividend 
puzzle questions why firms pay dividends and why investors are concerned with 
dividends if they are irrelevant, inflexible, costly and tax disadvantaged. Feldstein 
and Green (1983) raise a similar question of, why companies pay dividends on 
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condition that dividends are taxed more heavily than retained earnings. The 
transaction costs of selling shares cannot explain why dividends exist as companies 
can avoid such costs by buying back shares. Furthermore, dividend changes do not 
necessarily convey the forecasts of the company‘s prospect. For example, the 
dividend cut does not indicate that future performance will degenerate.  
 
 
Allen et al. (2000) summarise the current consensus, when they conclude that:  
―While a number of theories have been put forward in the literature to explain their 
pervasive presence, dividends remain one of the thorniest puzzles in corporate 
finance‖. Dividends still amount to more than double the total value of share 
repurchases (Jagannathan et al., 2000). As puzzling as this may be, it can be 
concluded that dividends and share repurchases can coexist. Some firms may prefer 
dividends while others only share repurchases. Furthermore, firms can change their 
method of cash redistribution depending on the current situation. 
   
 
2.5.  Why and How Companies Decide on a Dividend Policy 
The duty of maximizing shareholders‘ wealth often encourages the management of a 
firm to treat the dividend strategy as a critical matter (Ma, 2012). A firm‘s dividend 
policy decision is so crucial that the manner in which managers go about making 
dividend policy decisions and whether or not they follow a precise set of procedures 
or specific strategies to make these decisions, has a huge impact on the value of the 
firm (Deeptee & Roshan, 2009). Lintner (1956) conducted research on how top level 
managers formulated dividend policy decisions. He formulated a model consisting of 
the following variables: earnings stability, plant and equipment expenditures, 
willingness to use external financing, firm size, ownership by control groups and use 
of share dividends. In his findings, Lintner (1956) established that: corporate 
dividend decisions were made conservatively, managers targeted the dividend pay-
out ratio, the current year‘s dividend pay-out was not influenced by the profitability 
level of the same period (T) but had an impact on the profitability level of the next 
period (T+1), finally shares were repurchased when firms had accumulated a large 
amount of unwanted cash or had a desire to modify the capital structure. In later 
studies conducted on dividend policy, it was established that dividend increases (or 
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decreases) are usually followed by positive (or negative) abnormal returns (Pettit, 
1972; Asquith and Mullins, 1983; Grullon et al., 2002). Therefore, corporate dividend 
policy plays an essential role in the survival and progress of listed firms.  
 
 
In a later study conducted by Brav et al. (2005) it was asked whether pay-out 
decisions were still made conservatively. Ninety-four percent of dividend payers, who 
took part in this survey, strongly agreed that they were hesitant when it came to 
reducing dividends therefore; managers seek to maintain the existing level of 
dividends and avoid having to cut dividends except in extreme circumstances. 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (2008) documented further evidence 
demonstrating a strong reluctance of managers to cut their regular cash dividend. 
Daniel, Denis and Naveen (2010) expanded on this question and showed that 
dividend cuts occurred infrequently and when they did occur, they were generally 
preceded by a period of poor operating performance. Interestingly, a dividend cut 
seems more credible when investors observe the firm experiencing operating and 
financial difficulties however, in spite of the visible signs of poor performance 
investors still react negatively to their dividend cut announcements (DeAngelo & 
DeAngelo, 2006). Jensen, Lundstrum and Miller (2010) argued that a dividend cut 
signals a retrenchment within the firm. Cost-cutting measures from retrenchment 
policies result in firms allowing some of their growth options to expire therefore, 
investors end up having a negative sentiment towards dividend cuts. 
 
 
On the contrary, it has been said that the survival of any company is dependent on 
the continuous investment in facilities and the employment of internal financing, 
through the use of retained earnings (Uwuigbe, Jafaru & Ajayi, 2012). From time to 
time, firms need to cut back on dividends and reinvest funds into the company. In 
countries like Nigeria, government tends to put restrictions on the amount of 
dividends a company may pay. This forces companies to plough back part of their 
realized profits and ensures that funds are available for continuous investment in 
assets, so that the company continues to operate on the going concern principle. 
The aforementioned may be the reason why the propensity of firms to pay dividends 
has shown a global decline. The study conducted by Black (2013), indicates that the 
   
19 
 
percentage of firms paying dividends globally has dropped from 71% in 1991 to 61% 
in 2012, with declines occurring in both the United States and international markets. 
Even so, the popular view remains that dividend policy is important, as evidenced by 
the large amount of money involved and the attention that firms, security analysts, 
and investors give to dividends. Firms tend to follow a managed dividend policy 
rather than a residual dividend policy, which involves paying dividends from earnings 
left over after meeting investment needs (Baker & Weigand, 2015). 
 
 
Lintner (1956) indicated that one of the most important aspects of dividend policy 
(after the firm had determined its earnings) was choosing a pay-out ratio. While this 
outcome may have been obtained many years ago, authors such as Kapoor (2006) 
still find that companies generally prefer a stable dividend pay-out ratio because the 
shareholders expect it and reveal a preference for it. In the study conducted by 
Arnott and Asness (2003), it was found that higher aggregate dividend pay-out ratios 
were associated with higher future earnings growth. Zhou and Ruland (2006) 
supported these findings when they examined the possible impact of dividend pay-
outs on future earnings growth. In the investigation conducted by Amidu and Abor 
(2006) it was held that pay-out ratios were positively related to: profitability, cash flow 
and tax but were negatively related risk and growth. On the contrary, the study 
conducted by Brav et al. (2005) revealed that nearly 40% of the survey respondents 
stated that they target dividends per share, 28% said that they target dividend pay-
out, 27% target growth in dividends per share, 13% target dividend yield and 6% 
claim to not target dividends at all. The firms that were identified as cash cows 
primarily targeted the growth in dividends per share because they felt pressure to 
return capital to investors when earnings growth was robust. According to Brunzell, 
Liljeblom, Loflund and Vaihekoski (2014), a specific pay-out ratio which would 
always be followed would leave no information value for the dividend, in excess of 
that already conveyed through the disclosure of current earnings. The most famous 
statement about the relationship between dividend policy and corporate value 
claimed that, in the presence of perfect markets, given a firm's investment policy, the 
dividend pay-out policy it chooses to follow will affect neither the current price of its 
shares nor the total return to its shareholders. However, market imperfections such 
as differential tax rates, information asymmetries between insiders and outsiders, 
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conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders, transaction costs, flotation 
costs, and irrational investor behaviour, make the dividend decision relevant 
(Kapoor, 2009). 
 
 
2.6. Catering Theory of Dividends 
Miller and Modigliani (1961) proved that dividend policy was irrelevant to share value 
in perfect and efficient capital markets. After this theory was published many 
researchers criticized it, using various approaches. The catering theory of dividends 
was developed by Baker and Wurgler (2004a). In this theory, the assumption of 
perfect markets and efficient markets was relaxed and three basic ingredients were 
suggested.  First, for either psychological or institutional reasons, some investors 
have an uninformed and perhaps time-varying demand for dividend-paying shares. 
Second, arbitrage fails to prevent this demand from driving apart the prices of payers 
and nonpayers. Third, managers rationally cater to investor demand—they pay 
dividends when investors put higher prices on payers, and they do not pay when 
investors prefer nonpayers. The essence of the catering theory was that managers 
give investors what they currently want. In the case of dividends, catering implies 
that managers tend to initiate dividend pay-outs when investors put a relatively high 
share price on dividend payers, and tend to omit dividends when investors prefer 
nonpayers. Baker and Wurgler (2004a) then inquired about the source of investor 
demand for dividends. They did not find evidence of it springing from traditional 
dividend clienteles. Instead, sentiment appeared to be a key factor. However, once 
dividends were initiated, increases and decreases appeared to be governed more by 
firm-level profitability than by the relative valuations of payers and nonpayers. 
Therefore, the catering theory explains the number of payers but not the total pay-
outs by existing payers. 
 
 
The results obtained in the study conducted by Neves (2009) are consistent with 
previous arguments that: investors‘ sentiments can be significant when determining 
dividend pay-outs. This research reveals that investor sentiment significantly affects 
the propensity to pay dividends across firms in the Eurozone and, as expected, this 
effect is positive after controlling for traditional determinants of dividends, such as: 
   
21 
 
the free cash flow, leverage, earnings, tangible fixed assets and size. The findings of 
the study provide empirical support for the catering model previously documented in 
the United States firms.  
 
 
The paper written by Ramadan (2015) aimed to investigate the validity of the 
catering theory of dividends in the Jordanian market. Utilizing an unbalanced, pooled 
cross-sectional time series Ordinary Least Squares regression model (for all 
companies listed on the Amman Stock Exchange excluding the financial sector firms 
and non-consistent dividends-paying firms), it was found that the dividend premium 
which is a proxy for the catering theory, is affected by explanatory variables. 
Therefore, companies listed on the Amman Stock Exchange take investors‘ demand 
for dividends into account and react to this preference in their dividend policy. This 
confirms the validity of the catering theory of dividends in the Jordanian market. The 
study conducted by Abdulkadir, Abdullah and Wong (2014) examined the implication 
of catering theory of dividend in the Nigerian market. The study concentrated on the 
financial sector due to its exclusion in previous studies on dividend pay-out policies. 
The findings indicate that the dividend premium exerts a positive influence on the 
dividend pay-outs of the sampled firms. Therefore, financial firms listed on the 
Nigerian Stock Exchange consider investors demand for dividends and respond to 
this demand when making dividend pay-out decisions. Nonetheless, the study also 
concludes that catering to investors‘ demand for dividends by the sampled firms is 
limited to normal economic conditions and does not extend to crisis period. The 
paper written by Kim and Byun (2013) investigated the international presence of the 
dividend catering theory in different legal regimes from the period 1996 to 2010. 
Using a modified dividend premium, the authors find evidence of dividend catering 
among firms in common law countries, but not for those in civil law countries. 
Catering in common law countries persists even after controlling for the effect of 
fundamental variables like: profitability, size, and growth opportunities. In civil law 
countries, cash dividends are less responsive to the value premiums of dividend-
paying firms. These results suggest that when investors are well protected and 
negative sentiment is present, they force dividends from managers by placing a high 
value on dividend-paying firms. The aim of the research conducted by Handary, 
Lukviarman and Febrianto (2006) was to investigate the association between market 
   
22 
 
reaction around the dividend announcement and investor demand for dividends, by 
using dividend catering theory to be tested within Indonesian firms listed on the 
Jakarta Stock Exchange. In the study, results showed that there is a positive, 
statistically significant correlation between the dividend yield variable and share 
returns. This means that the share returns will be high if the ratio of dividend yields is 
also high. Nevertheless, most announcement windows show that share returns 
become lower when investor sentiment for dividends is higher. The reason for the 
negative relationship between the dividend premium and share return may be 
explained on the research conducted by Denis and Osobov (2005). In their study 
they concluded that the dividend premium is a proxy for the relative growth 
opportunity of dividend payers rather than a measure of investor sentiment. 
 
 
While there may have been a large number of studies that supported the catering 
theory, there were some studies that disagreed with notion. In the study conducted 
by Rashid, Nor and Ibrahim (2013) it was held that the dividend catering incentive 
creates disequilibrium in the market because it leads to the conclusion that 
companies pay dividends not because they have a reserve of income but because 
investors want dividends as a tangible income. Furthermore, this theory goes against 
the life-cycle theory which states that firms pay-out dividends when they reach a 
certain level of maturity in their lifecycle. In addition to the aforementioned, the paper 
written by Tsuji (2010) revealed that the dividend initiation decision of Japanese 
electrical appliances industry firms has no predictive power for relative future 
negative returns of payers over nonpayers. This evidence is inconsistent with the 
suggestions of catering theory of dividends by Baker and Wurgler (2004a). More 
precisely, the excess returns of payers over nonpayers is statistically significantly 
negative in the United States, while future excess returns of payers over nonpayers 
are positive in the Japanese electrical appliances industry firms.  
 
 
Having looked at the various arguments for and against this theory, it is important to 
acknowledge that there is more to the story than dividend catering. While the 
dividend premium may have significant explanatory power, so do individual firm 
characteristics. There are both internal and external factors affecting decisions to 
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change dividends and the capital market‘s reaction to such decisions. The role of 
other non-catering factors is especially apparent in the negative share market 
reaction to dividend decreases, which the dividend catering theory cannot explain by 
itself. 
 
 
2.7. Signalling Theory 
2.7.1. Signalling Theory of Dividends 
Baker (2009) states that: certain sources of company information (accounting data 
and future prospect reports) are not completely reliable. These kinds of information 
do not always present a company‘s profitable business opportunities and may be 
influenced by management. Given that outside investors have imperfect information 
regarding the firm‘s profit opportunities, the company has to find other ways in order 
to convince outside investors about future cash flows and profits. Dividend pay-outs 
are perceived as a tool for communicating information to the market (Bernartzi et al., 
1997). According to signalling theory, corporate managers use dividend pay-outs to 
signal information to the markets (Baker & Kapoor, 2015). Unlike most events, 
dividend declarations are backed by cash therefore, they are more credible (Asquith 
& Mullins, 1983). Under the title of signalling or information content of dividends, a 
number of studies have examined the reaction of the share market to dividend 
announcements. Modigliani–Miller (1959) and Miller–Modigliani (1961) put forward 
an argument which stated that dividend reductions convey information that future 
earnings prospects are poor. Lintner (1956) indicated that dividends provide a 
signalling device and the market uses dividend announcements to value firm's share. 
Shareholders may not be interested dividends however they may look at changes in 
a company‘s dividend policy. Changes in dividend pay-outs are perceived as being a 
signal of the company‘s prospects, where increased dividend pay-outs are viewed as 
good news and the market reacts positively to them (Naser, Nuseibeh & Rashed, 
2013). Despite the fact that dividends have a higher tax rate compared to capital 
gains, investors are willing to pay a higher tax rate for dividends in exchange for the 
positive signal dividends send regarding the future prospects of the firm. Lintner‘s 
(1956) investigation found that dividend increases were actually an indication of 
permanent increases in earnings while dividend decreases were a sign of continuous 
declines in earnings. At a later stage, Bhattacharya (1979), Miller and Rock (1985) 
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and John and Williams (1985) found supporting evidence for Linter‘s (1956) 
investigation. According to these theorists, dividend policy changes were in fact a 
signal of a firm‘s future expectations and it was normal for managers to anticipate 
increased: profitability, earnings and growth rates. Essentially what this supposition 
meant was that there was a positive relationship between changes in dividends and 
the subsequent share price reaction (Sharma, 2001). If a firm had experienced a 
dividend cut, the firm would also experience a decline in average earnings per share 
(Howatt et al., 2009). This was not surprising, as the study conducted by Aharony 
and Swary (1980) showed that when dividends decreased, the average share price 
decrease was –3.76% and when they rose, the share price increased +0.72%. Both 
results were statistically significant. The share price reaction to dividend increases or 
decreases suggests that investors perceive these changes as positive or negative 
news about a firm (Grullon et al., 2002). Nevertheless, what is particularly interesting 
is that some studies find the share price changes to be temporary. As soon as 
investors discover that the dividend changes were not based on the estimated future 
earnings of the firm, the temporary share price increase disappears (Black & 
Scholes, 1974). 
  
 
While most theorists believe that dividends signal information to investors, there 
have been many studies which have rejected Linter‘s (1956) hypothesis of dividends 
being a signal of a firm‘s future prospects. The study conducted by Watts (1973), 
found that unexpected dividend changes contained little information on the future 
earnings of a firm. Furthermore, there were no irregularities in share returns, during 
the two month period surrounding the dividend announcements. According to the 
findings by Sharma (2001), firm profitability decreased after dividend initiations while 
Bernartzi et al. (1997) established that there was limited evidence supporting the 
view that dividend changes had some sort of information content about future 
prospects. In fact there was a robust link between past earnings and dividend 
changes and a strong suggestion that dividend cuts were a signal of increases in 
future earnings. More recently, the move to deliver cash back to Apple shareholders 
was viewed as the company admitting that it had reached a certain level of maturity 
and growth prospects would be difficult to come by in the future. Therefore, 
dividends do not directly reveal the future prospects of a firm.  
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The majority of firms still pay dividends, even though dividends are costly in so many 
ways (Bernartzi et al., 1997). This is due to the fact that most of these firms have 
paid dividends for many years and are obligated to continue with these practices 
(Skinner, 2008). Since Lintner‘s (1956) paper, mangers have been hesitant to cut 
dividends even if they prefer not to pay them at all they are forced to do so by the 
firm‘s history (Skinner, 2008). Essentially, the aforementioned states that even 
though dividends do not have any signalling information, managers will declare 
dividends and initiate dividend policy changes because of the firm‘s history. For this 
reason, it becomes extremely difficult to draw information from dividend changes. 
 
 
2.7.2. Signalling Theory of Share Repurchases 
Textbook discussions on pay-out policy generally suggest that dividends and share 
repurchases are more or less equivalent ways of paying out cash flows (Brealey & 
Myers, 1996). In practise, dividends and repurchases are used at different places in 
the business cycle by different types of firms. In contrast to dividends, which grow 
smoothly, aggregate share repurchases are volatile and vary considerably with the 
business cycle. Companies increase their repurchases disproportionately relative to 
dividends, during boom times and reduce them more during recessions 
(Jagannathan et al., 2000).  As a result, several executives perceive share 
repurchases as being more flexible than dividends, and they use this flexibility in an 
attempt to time the market by accelerating repurchases when they believe their 
share price is low (Brav et al., 2005). According to Ikenberry et al. (1995), firms with 
high book-to-market ratios (or value shares) are more likely to have undervaluation 
as their primary motivation for repurchasing shares. At the other extreme, it is more 
probable for firms with low book-to-market ratios to repurchase shares for reasons 
other than undervaluation.  
 
  
The explanation most commonly offered in literature for the repurchase of shares is 
that corporate managers use this action to 'signal' to the market. The company's 
management is better informed about the company's true value than outside 
shareholders. This information asymmetry can lead to shares being priced below 
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their intrinsic value. Share repurchase plans convey a more credible signal than 
repeated verbal or written statements by management that company shares are 
undervalued (Miller & Rock, 1985). According to Persons (1997), share repurchases 
are a more useful signal than: dividends, corporate philanthropy or advertising. 
Moreover, large and significantly positive returns are experienced by the ordinary 
shareholders of repurchasing firms. Vermaelen (1981) examined the price behaviour 
of shares repurchased by companies in the open market. His sample size consisted 
of 243 open market offers (made between 1970 and April 1978) by 198 United 
States companies. The results of the study showed that open market share 
repurchases had a cumulative abnormal share price decline of -6,99% from (T-60) 
until (T-2) then from (T-2) to (T0), the two-day average abnormal share return was 
3,37% and the subsequent cumulative abnormal share return decline from (T+3) to 
(T+60) was-1,31%. It was therefore concluded that companies repurchasing their 
shares were signalling undervaluation to the market. In addition to the 
aforementioned, signalling models suggest that firms adjust their cash distribution 
level to signal their future prospects in the market. A declaration of a share 
repurchase program typically signals that the firm will do better. In the survey 
conducted by Dhanani and Roberts (2009), it was recognised that investors perceive 
share repurchase programmes as having a positive impact on the share price, 
however with regard to company value, investors understand that this is a gradual 
process, taking place over a long-term period.  
 
 
Academic studies have examined a number of reasons for why firms repurchase 
shares. As previously mentioned the explanation that share repurchases signal 
undervaluation, has been a key focus of several papers. Similarly, it is also for this 
same reason that low-quality firms may announce an open market buyback program. 
The market, on average, reacts positively to open market share repurchases, yet by 
design, these programs are not binding and are structured for flexibility. Therefore 
they afford managers the ability to authorize a buyback even if there is no intention 
to buy back shares and have the possibility of manipulating investor opinion 
(Bhattacharya & Dittmar, 2004). One might question that if some repurchases are 
manipulative in intent, why it is that the market does not penalize these shares? 
Even though low-earnings quality firms do not show positive abnormal long-run 
   
27 
 
return performance, by the same token there is no evidence of a negative drift. 
Instead, their long-term share performance is comparable to firms with similar firm 
characteristics, which suggests that repurchase events made by low earnings quality 
firms have no long-term signalling effect. One of the main reasons behind this is that 
while managers in high discretionary accrual (DA, defined as the residual for a given 
case away from its respective expected value) firms may be working to manipulate 
investor perception, their market price at the time of the buyback is not overvalued. 
As a matter of fact, high DA firms who announce a share repurchase have typically 
suffered steep declines in market capitalization in the prior year. After such losses, it 
may be the case that managers are simply hoping to prevent any further erosion in 
price. Furthermore, given the fact that the size of the initial announcement effect for 
all firms (including high DA firms) is small, roughly 2%, a price change of this 
magnitude when corrected later will be difficult to distinguish and leaves little 
economically material drift to estimate.  
 
 
The fact that some company managers appear to be misleading the market may 
provide some insight into why investors seem to react with scepticism to repurchase 
announcements (Chan, Ikenberry & Lee 2007).  According to Asquith and Mullins 
(1986), false signalling may mislead the market for a short time. Market vengeance 
is not immediate, nonetheless it is not unavoidable. Announcing  share repurchase 
programs is costless (in a monetary sense), as both overvalued and undervalued 
firms can announce their intentions, however companies announcing share 
repurchase programs without implementing it put their credibility at risk. Moreover, 
the loss of credibility and reputation from not implementing a share repurchase 
announcement may be perceived as a cost associated with false signalling and 
investors‘ being misled. Nonetheless, carrying out share repurchases is a costly tool, 
in a monetary sense (Bukalska, 2014). 
 
 
2.8. Tax Implications 
2.8.1. The Tax Implications of Share Repurchases 
Share repurchases and dividends are two means by which firms distribute cash to 
shareholders and decrease the agency costs resulting from excess cash flow 
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(Jensen, 1986). However, the current tax code puts dividends at a tax-
disadvantaged relative to other available financial strategies. Grullon and Michaely 
(2002) suggest that the main reason behind the growth in share repurchases in the 
United States, is as a result of the relative tax disadvantage of dividends. Therefore, 
one finds many firms repurchasing shares in order to allow shareholders to benefit 
from the preferential tax treatment of repurchases relative to dividends (Vermaelen, 
1981).  
 
 
The personal tax savings hypothesis states that repurchases are beneficial because 
they are more tax efficient than paying out dividends. The thrust of this argument is 
that, holding total cash pay-out fixed, personal taxes are reduced and hence share 
value is increased when share repurchases are substituted for dividend distributions 
(Dann, 1981). To add to the above mentioned, Kaplan and Reishus (1990) propose 
that since the income tax rate is higher than the capital gains tax rate, management 
may prefer to engage in share repurchases, the gains of which are taxed at the 
capital gains tax rate, rather than dividends. Hirtle (2003) continues by stating that 
managers holding options will also prefer share repurchases to dividends due to tax 
incentives and because repurchases, in contrast to dividends, do not dilute share 
value. In the study conducted by Lie and Lie (1999) results show that tax 
considerations play a significant role in the choice between a repurchase and a 
dividend furthermore, there is considerable pressure from institutional investors to 
take advantage of tax benefits. 
 
 
In the past decade major companies operating in the United States have increasingly 
repurchased significant amounts of their own ordinary shares because repurchasing 
shares, rather than paying dividends, has significant tax advantages for 
shareholders. A similar culture exists in Turkey since share repurchasing is more tax 
efficient when compared to paying out dividends. This may be as a result of 
dividends having a 15% withholding tax rate, while capital gains have a maximum 
tax rate of 10%, for both companies and individual taxpayers (Dizkirici, 2013). 
Australia also has a general preference for capital gains relative to dividends, on the 
basis of tax efficiency (Mitchell & Robinson, 1999). Le Roux (2006) reported that 
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South African companies preferred share repurchases to special dividends due to 
tax benefits associated with share buybacks. Furthermore, the lower taxes have led 
to a growth in share repurchases, which only became legal in South Africa on the 
30th of June 1999 after the signing of the Companies Amendment Act No 37 of 1999 
(Firer et al.,  2008). In an article written by Wesson (2015), the big spenders on the 
Johannesburg Securities Exchange (JSE) include companies like: Sasol (R16 billion 
worth of shares repurchased), Telkom (R6.5 billion), Netcare (R5.5 billion), Remgro 
(R5.1 billion), Aveng (R4.2 billion) and Bidvest (R4 billion). The full repurchase figure 
for JSE companies could be closer to R50 billion per year. What these companies 
have in common is that they are all mature, blue chip companies. Firms of this 
nature are generally taxed much higher and for that reason, they may show a 
preference for capital gains relative to dividends.  
 
 
When shifting our attention to a different school of thought (that is:  the corporate 
savings hypothesis), Vermaelen (2006) argues that if a company borrows money to 
buy back shares, it lowers its corporate tax bill. This supposition is in line with the 
study conducted by Miller and Modigliani (1963), where it was shown that in the 
presence of corporate taxes, firms can increase their value by increasing the 
proportion of debt in their capital structure. Debt has tax advantages at the corporate 
level because interest payments reduce the firm‘s taxable income while dividends 
and share repurchases do not. Therefore, interest tax shields give companies a 
powerful incentive to increase leverage. In a perfect world, where there are no 
bankruptcy costs, a firm‘s value increases while it‘s cost of capital decreases, as 
more debt is increased. Nevertheless the world is far from perfect, distress costs 
dominate at high leverage. For that reason, a firm will always have an optimal or 
target debt range at which the incremental value of tax shields from a small change 
in leverage exactly offset the incremental distress costs (Lewellen & Lewellen, 2005).  
Reducing agency costs of free cash flow or lowering corporate taxes by increasing 
net debt, is strong motivation for shareholders to support the notion of companies 
borrowing money so as to repurchase shares. Having said that, it is important to note 
that the existence of a tax advantage for debt financing does not necessarily mean 
that companies should at all times seek to use the maximum possible amount of 
debt in their capital structures. Other forms of financing, notably retained earnings, 
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may in some circumstances be cheaper. More importantly, there are limitations 
imposed by lenders as well as many other dimensions (and kinds of costs) in the 
real-world (Modigliani & Miller, 1963). Furthermore, Lie and Lie (1999) argue that a 
large appreciation in the share price, prior to repurchases, reduces the tax 
advantage of repurchases relative to dividends. In the study conducted by Brav et al. 
(2005), managers were asked whether the tax advantage that repurchases had over 
dividends affected their decision to repurchase, 41.8% agreed that it did. These 
executives frequently cited tax inefficiency as a factor that caused them to favour 
repurchases over dividends. However, when dividend-payers were asked why they 
do not reduce dividends (or increase them less) because of tax inefficiency, it 
became clear that investor-level taxes were not a dominant factor. Overall, 
executives indicated that the differential in taxes was a consideration, but not a first-
order concern, in pay-out policy decisions. In concluding this section on share 
repurchases and taxes, it should be noted that if investors are rational, they should 
prefer lower taxes to higher taxes on the cash flows they receive from their 
investments, and this should lead to a preference for repurchases over dividends.  
 
 
2.8.2. The Tax Implications of Dividends 
Numerous theories have been put forward in the literature, to explain the presence of 
dividends. Corporates pay dividends and investors pay tax on those dividends. 
Investors also pay tax on capital gains when they sell their share, however they can 
choose when to do so (Dahlquist, Robertsson & Rydqvist, 2009). If dividends are 
taxed more heavily than capital gains, as in most countries, share repurchases 
should be more superior to dividends. Nonetheless, dividends continue to be a 
substantial proportion of earnings and personal dividend taxes continue to be a 
substantial source of income. Miller and Modigliani (1961) held that investors can 
reduce the overall tax bill by sorting themselves into clienteles, in which low-tax 
investors collect dividends and high-tax investors realize capital gains. The theory of 
tax clienteles for dividend policies predicts that after a firm initiates dividends, tax-
exempt institutions for which dividends are not disadvantaged will purchase shares 
being sold by individual investors for whom dividends are tax disadvantaged. As a 
result, the ownership of a dividend initiator‘s equity by tax-exempt investors is 
expected to increase after initiation. Supporting evidence, in the paper written by 
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Allen, Bernardo and Welch (2000) found that institutional investors were more likely 
to invest in dividend-paying shares because of their tax advantage. In addition, the 
research conducted by Dahlquist, et al. (2009) held that tax neutral investors, 
investment funds and partnerships behave according to the predictions of the 
dividend tax clientele hypothesis, while the evidence relating to businesses and 
individuals is ambiguous and depends on sample and empirical specification. Thus 
when investing in shares, it can be said that investors take taxes into account. If an 
investor faces high dividend taxes, in comparison to capital gains taxes, he/she will 
either choose share repurchases or shares with a low dividend yield. However, in the 
case of pension funds and university endowments (which are tax exempt) the tax 
benefit of a share repurchase will not be applicable (Bender & Ward, 2002). It was 
then questioned as to which investments tax-exempt investors move from, when 
they move into dividend paying firms. It is expected that tax-exempt investors move 
out of similar equity investments that already pay a dividend because this would be 
consistent with trading off dividend pay-outs and diversification in a natural way 
(Dhaliwal, Erickson & Trezevant, 1999).   
 
 
Having heard the argument of the tax clientele theory of dividend, the question 
becomes: why would a firm want to attract institutional investors? When a firm pays 
higher dividends, it attracts a disproportionately larger ownership by institutions, and 
these institutions in turn are more likely to play a larger role in overseeing 
management than dispersed retail investors. Having large corporates as investors 
means that firms can have easier access to resources such as capital. It also boosts 
the reputation of the company which has large corporates as its shareholders. 
Therefore, it is expected that managers would weigh the positive share price 
response to the announcement of dividends against the consequences of angering 
institutional shareholders, if they were forced to have to cut the dividends in 
response to poorer performance (Allen et al., 2000). 
 
 
In the study conducted by Brav et al. (2005) found that taxes are of second-order 
importance when considering a particular pay-out policy. Forty-two percent of 
companies that had repurchased shares agreed that the tax advantage over 
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dividends affected their decision to repurchase shares, however personal taxes were 
not a dominant factor when considering a particular pay-out policy. According to 
Farre-Mensa, Michaely and Schmalz (2014), studies centred on the United States 
May 2003 dividend tax cut confirm that differences in the taxation of dividends and 
capital gains have only a second-order impact on setting pay-out policy. Denis and 
Setpanyan (2009) also conclude that taxes do not seem to be a first-order 
determinant of dividend policies, which casts doubt on theories of dividend policy 
that focus on tax-based clienteles. Even though empirical results show that taxes 
have a minor effect on dividend policy, it was suggested by Grullon and Michaely 
(2002) that the issuance of dividends has decreased and the number of firms 
repurchasing shares has grown. They propose that the growth in the number of 
share repurchasers is due to the fact that in most markets, capital gains are taxed at 
a lower rate than dividend income and rational investors should prefer lower taxes as 
opposed to higher taxes. Baker, Singleton and Veit (2011) conclude the results in the 
United States and outside the United States are inconsistent, depending on the time 
period and country. For firms in the United States, evidence shows that taxes are a 
second-order determinant of dividend decisions. However, managerial surveys 
involving firms operating outside the United States produce mixed results. The 
dividend puzzle remains unsolved. Why do firms or managers not have cheaper and 
better ways of attracting institutions? 
 
 
It should be noted however that the National Treasury and the South African 
Revenue Services identified a problem with share repurchases. According to their 
findings outgoing shareholder can avoid capital gains tax partially or completely by 
opting to sell shares back to the target company rather than selling shares to the 
incoming shareholder (Parker, 2016). Going forward, 33% of capital gains will be 
included in taxable income to be taxed at the normal tax rates applicable for 
individuals. On the other hand, dividends from South African companies will be 
exempt from income tax but will be subject to dividend tax at a rate of 15%. This 
excludes sums received from a pension or retirement funds (Deloitte, 2016). 
Therefore, dividends will be taxed at a lower rate than share repurchases. 
Nonetheless, the study at hand examines the period when dividends were taxed 
higher than capital gains. 
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2.9. The Behavioural Aspects of Corporate Dividend Policy  
Corporate dividend policies vary. Traditionally, these variations are explained by 
differences in the tax system and the relevance of signalling devices as well as of 
agency problems due to informational asymmetries (Breuer, Rieger & Soypak, 
2014). Recently, cultural aspects have been suggested as another reason for this 
finding. Furthermore, it is often argued that behavioural patterns may be a main 
determinant of corporate dividend policy as well. Different behavioural elements 
include self-control, mental accounting, hedonic editing, and regret aversion. 
Numerous demographic factors such as age, income, and retirement status can also 
affect an investor‘s preference for dividends (Baker & Weigand, 2015). Shefrin 
(2009) investigates various behavioural explanations of dividends and finds that a 
combination of subjective and empirical evidence provides strong support for 
behaviourally based theory. For example, the evidence shows that older, retired, and 
low-income households prefer dividend-paying shares to finance consumption. On 
the contrary, younger investors with moderate to high incomes have little need to 
finance consumption with dividends. The behavioural life cycle model by Shefrin and 
Thaler (1988), stipulates that people allocate their income in three different accounts: 
the current income account (I), the current asset account (A), and the future income 
account (F). Based on this differentiation, several reasons have been proposed to 
explain why dividends may be favoured to capital gains under certain instances. 
Consumption financed from accounts (A) and (F) involves subjectively felt penalties, 
as investors want to exercise self-control regarding the potential danger of excessive 
consumption due to time-inconsistency problems. Cash dividends are placed in the 
(I) account and therefore there is no penalty involved for the consumption financed 
by cash dividends. On the contrary capital gains through share price increases are 
placed in (A) account and consuming from this account will cause disutility. Hence, 
dividends are better suited for consumption purchases and impatient investors who 
want to consume with a clear conscience will prefer firms to pay-out a certain share 
of gains as dividends. As a result, different clienteles favour different companies 
because of their respective dividend policies which suit their saving and consumption 
decisions.  
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There is an argument which states that the demand for dividends by investors varies 
over time. In low-sentiment periods (e.g., recessions) investors may prefer 
saferdividend-paying shares, while in good times (e.g., booms) investors prefer 
riskier shares that invest their earnings rather than distribute them (Baker & Wurgler, 
2004b).  Thus, non-payer firms initiate dividend pay-outs when investor demand for 
dividends is high, and dividend paying firms tend to omit dividend payments more 
frequently when investors do not appreciate dividends. The idea of firms‘ catering to 
investors is not new.  Numerous studies find evidence supporting the hypothesis that 
firms respond to investor demand across a variety of firm policies. For example Lee, 
Shleifer, and Thaler (1991) show that new closed-end funds are started when the 
discount of closed-end funds share prices is low relative to the underlying net asset 
value (NAV) and when investor sentiment is high (measured as the premium on 
small shares).  
 
 
From an investor‘s point of view, Thaler and Shefrin (1981) and Shefrin and Statman 
(1984) suggest that shareholders favour dividends as a self-control mechanism. If 
investors were deprived of dividends, they would be tempted to sell shares and use 
the proceeds for consumption, and they might sell more shares than they originally 
intended. In this explanation, dividends help investors to pace consumption and 
avoid later regret from their own overconsumption. In addition to the afore-
mentioned, Shefrin and Statman (1984) propose that investors may prefer dividends 
because they derive less utility from one big gain (e.g., a large capital gain) than 
from a series of small gains (e.g., a small capital gain and a dividend). Therefore, 
there is a higher marginal propensity to consume from dividends than from capital 
gains (Baker, Nagel, & Wurgler, 2007). From a manager‘s point of view, it has been 
found that managers who are over confident and optimistic about their firms‘ cash 
flows are less likely to pay dividends (Cordeiro, 2009). Deshmukh, Goel, and Howe 
(2009) find that the level of pay-out (dividend yield) is lower for optimistic managers. 
The rationale behind these findings is that managers with a strong belief in their 
firm‘s future prefer to invest cash in firm projects rather than pay it out to investors. In 
addition, these authors show that the market reaction to dividend increases by 
optimistic managers is less positive than the response to announcements by less 
optimistic managers. While that may be said, researchers such as Bouwman (2009), 
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present evidence which supports the notion that; managers who are optimistic about 
their future earnings distribute larger dividends. In fact the market reacts more 
strongly to dividend changes announced by optimistic managers. In another study of 
managerial overconfidence, Ben-David, Graham, and Harvey (2009), find no 
evidence that over confident managers are less likely to pay dividends. Furthermore, 
the study finds that managers who are more confident about their forecasts 
implement aggressive corporate policies including high dividends, high investments 
and high leverage. The results presented by the various authors are in contrast to 
one and another. This further supports the notion that the dividend puzzle is more 
complex than what it seems. Nevertheless, the various papers do show that there is 
a behavioural element behind dividend pay-outs. This may be seen in how managers 
and shareholders act or perceive dividend pay-outs. 
 
 
2.10. Bird-in-the-Hand Theory 
According to Gordon (1963), shareholders prefer cash dividends as they are more 
certain than capital gains. When a particular firm makes high dividend pay-outs, that 
firm is able to maximize its firm value and get a higher rating from rating agencies 
(Gordon, 1963). Moreover, Al-Malkawi et al. (2010) argue that on average, a dollar of 
dividends has four times the impact on share prices as compared to a dollar of 
retained earnings. Therefore, the bird-in-the-hand hypothesis suggests that 
shareholders need to realise their wealth and as a result of this, prefer dividends 
over capital gains (Ben-David, 2010). The true essence of the bird-in-the-hand 
theory of dividend policy is that shareholders are risk-averse and prefer to receive 
dividend payments rather than future capital gains. Shareholders consider dividend 
payments rather than future capital gains therefore a bird-in-the-hand is worth more 
than two in the bush. The payment of current dividends resolves investor uncertainty.  
Investors have a preference for a certain level of income rather than the prospect of 
a higher but less certain, income at some time in the future. Therefore, investors will 
bid up prices of the ordinary shares of companies that pay generous dividends, 
relative to similar companies that pay smaller dividends (Black & Scholes, 1974).  
This theory was developed as a response to the Miller and Modigliani dividend 
irrelevance theory (1961), since then more studies have found striking evidence 
suggesting that dividend pay-outs are important to investors and assist them when 
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making investment decisions (Deeptee & Roshan, 2009). Furthermore, results 
obtained by Baker and Wurgler (2004), indicate that dividends are highly relevant to 
share value. If a company announces an increase in dividend pay-outs, investors 
generally react positively.  
 
 
Another reason as to why dividends are paid may be that firms paying healthy 
dividends are perceived as being relatively honest and less subject to accounting 
manipulations. Laing (2002) states that one should embrace shares that pay healthy 
dividends (a bird- in-the-hand is better than two in the bush). Healthy dividend 
payments also indicate that companies are generating real earnings rather than 
cooking the books. Buying dividend paying shares is a way of getting growth yet 
lowering risk (Amidu, 2007). Furthermore, dividend payment reduces the investor‘s 
transactions cost since the investor does not have to sell in the market the 
correspondent amount of share increased value of the retained earnings (Nikolaos, 
Evangelos & Dimitrios, 2010). When making dividend pay-out, the firm gets a higher 
rating from agencies as compared to a firm not making any dividend pay-out. With a 
better rating, the firm will be able to raise fiancé more easily from capital markets 
since credit institutions will be willing to give loans to the firm since the pay-out of 
dividends shows that the firm has the ability to meet its obligations (Deepte & 
Roshan, 2009).  
 
 
A number of studies demonstrate that the bird-in- the-hand theory fails if it is posited 
in a complete and perfect market with investors who behave according to notions of 
rational behaviour. Furthermore, it has been held that a dividend payment does not 
affect risk rather it reduces the proportion of the investor‘s assets in equities. The 
investor who believes the firm‘s investment policy is too risky would desire such a 
reduction. If the investor wishes to reduce his investment in a firm, he can do so by 
selling part of his holdings. For shareholders who prefer a bird-in-the-hand to the 
perceived uncertainties of corporate investment, such homemade dividends 
substitute perfectly for corporate dividends (Easterbrook & Fischel, 1981).  
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An interesting observation made by Baker and Wurgler (2004) holds that investors 
who favour dividends (i.e. retirees and those who hold dividend paying shares for 
income despite the tax penalty) are said to be driven by behavioural biases, such as 
a lack of understanding, and are more likely to fall for the bird-in-hand argument. 
Furthermore, Bhattacharya (1979) states that, there is a certain level of risk which is 
associated with dividends. This risk is based on the micro and marco environment of 
the firm that is the business line the firm operates, the location of the business, 
labour power, human capital, competitive forces and so on. He continues by 
explaining that the riskiness of a firm‘s cash flow will influence its dividend payments 
however, an increase in dividends will not reduce the risk of the firm. Companies 
encountering greater uncertainty about future cash flows tend to have lower pay-out 
ratios. Keown, Martin, Petty and Scott (2007) also argue against the theory by 
stating that increases in current dividends do not decrease the riskiness of the 
company, however they do in fact work in the opposite direction. If an increase in 
dividends is made, the managers have to issue new shares in order to raise the 
much needed capital. Therefore a dividend payment just transfers the risk from old 
shareholders to new shareholders. The bird-in-the-hand theory is in stark contrast 
with some of the theories proposed in the afore-mentioned. If investors prefer to 
have some money in the hand, why would they choose dividends which have higher 
tax implications, it would make sense for them to choose share repurchases instead. 
Furthermore, there have been reports of managers retrenching workers or borrowing 
heavily, so as to meet their dividend payments. A rational investor would wait for the 
company to stabilize its finances first before demanding a dividend pay-out. 
Moreover, the various methods of meeting dividends payments are not sustainable.  
There will come a point where the company will not have enough funds to meet the 
dividend payments.  
 
 
An interesting point to note is that companies like Google and Amazon have grown 
in leaps and bounds, without paying dividends. Funds are invested internally 
therefore; additional shares do not have to be issued all the time so as to raise 
funds. The notion behind the bird-in- the- hand theory stems from a behavioural 
aspect of dividend policy. When a company decides to initiate dividend payments, 
investors get used to those payments. If a company decides not to pay those 
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dividends, for whatever reasons, investors find this strange and perceive this as an 
increase in their risk profile and a decrease in that particular company‘s growth. As 
previous studies have shown, this is not always the case. A firm may decide to retain 
funds so as to invest in research and development, positive NPV projects and so on. 
However, since investors are used to the dividend payment, they do not even 
consider other factors because of learnt behaviour (a bird-in-the hand is worth more 
than two in the bush). 
 
 
2.11. Life Cycle Theory of Dividends 
According to the firm life-cycle theory of dividends, a firm‘s ability to find profitable 
investment opportunities diminishes as it matures. Eventually, it becomes optimal for 
the firm to distribute its free cash flow to shareholders in the form of dividends. 
Therefore, dividend policy is a function of a firm‘s life cycle. Essentially, this means 
that high- growth firms with larger cash flows and fewer projects tend to pay more of 
their earnings out as dividends (Kapoor, 2006). Newly listed firms, with 
predominantly unstable profitability, but strong growth opportunities, are typically 
firms in the growth stage of their life-cycle consequently they are not proper 
candidates to pay dividends according to the life-cycle theory of dividends (Fama & 
French, 2001). The research conducted by Knight (1921) and Schumpeter (1934), 
Mueller (1972) suggests that a firm innovates, in an attempt to exploit an invention 
involving a new product, process, marketing or organizational technique. In its initial 
stages, the firm devotes all available resources in developing the innovation and 
improving its profitability. The firm‘s growth is likely to be slow until it has 
successfully sorted out teething issues and establishes a foothold in the market. 
Thereafter, the company will grow rapidly, as it enters new markets and expands its 
customer base before any major competition can arise. After a while, competitors 
begin to enter the market, adopting and improving upon the pioneering firm‘s 
innovations. As existing markets become saturated and new markets are harder to 
find, the growth of the firm begins to slow down. As a result, the firm eventually 
reaches a point where it lacks profitable investment opportunities for the cash 
generated from its existing operations. At this mature stage, a shareholder value-
maximizing firm would begin distributing its earnings to its shareholders. 
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 Bulan, Subramanian and Tanlu (2007) find supporting evidence that firms initiate 
dividends after reaching maturity in their life cycles. In their study, dividend initiators 
are firms that have grown larger, are more profitable, have greater cash reserves, 
and have fewer growth opportunities compared to non-initiators at the same stage in 
their life cycles. They also find that no significant improvement in profitability or 
growth occurs around the initiation. DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Stulz (2006) 
investigate the life-cycle theory by examining whether the probability to pay 
dividends is related to the earned/contributed capital mix as measured by retained 
earnings to total equity (RE/TE) or retained earnings to total assets (RE/TA). In this 
research paper it was found that firms with low RE/TE (RE/TA) tend to be in the 
growth stage and reliant on external capital. However, firms with high RE/TE 
(RE/TA) tend to have accumulated high profits and are fairly mature. As a result, 
companies of this nature are good candidates to pay dividends. In a more study, 
Denis and Osbov (2008) examine cross-sectional and time series evidence on the 
propensity to pay dividends in six developed financial markets (United States of 
America, Canada, United Kingdom, Germany, France and Japan). They find that in 
all six countries, the probability of paying dividends is strongly associated with the 
ratio of retained earnings to total equity. The segment of firms that pay dividends is 
high when this ratio is also high and low when retained earnings are negative. 
 
 
There is a broad consensus about the life-cycle theory of dividends many studies 
find that mature firms are more likely to pay dividends. In essence, these are large 
firms with low investment opportunities, stable cash flows, good governance, and low 
idiosyncratic risk. Nevertheless, this theory is in contrast with the signalling theory of 
dividends, which predicts that a firm will pay dividends to signal to the market that its 
growth and profitability have improved (Baker & Weigand, 2015). The life cycle 
theory of dividends is basically an indicator to investors that the firm has reached its 
maximum growth potential and can no longer find profitable projects to invest in. In 
addition, Baker et al., (2011) find limited evidence supporting the life-cycle theory of 
dividends. They conclude that the theory is descriptive in nature rather than having 
an economic rationale because it fails to explain why firms distribute dividends. 
Therefore, the puzzle of why investors like dividends and why firms distribute them 
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remains unresolved. Perhaps a richer, more unified theory of dividend policy, with 
the life-cycle framework as its backbone, can help explain the dividend puzzle. 
 
 
2.12. Agency Theory 
2.12.1 Agency Theory of Dividends 
Corporate managers are agents of shareholders, therefore shareholders wish for 
management to run the company in a way that increases shareholder value. 
However, management may wish to grow the company in ways that are not in the 
best interests of shareholders yet maximize their personal power and wealth. The 
agency cost theory exists as a result of a separation between ownership and the 
management of a particular company. Jensen (1986) suggests that excessive free 
cash flow may produce agency costs, which are imposed on shareholders because 
managers do not always behave as the best stewards of investors. 
 
 
Agency costs may come in the form of managers engaging in short-term cost-
augmenting activities which indirectly enhance their non-salary income (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). Another form of agency cost happens in the long-term, and is 
especially damaging to the value of firm. Empire building occurs when managers 
want to satisfy their need for status, prestige and authority. This comes about when 
they: over-invest in firm size and/or growth-enhancing assets or over diversify with 
non-positive NPV projects (Baumol, 1959). There are two solutions to these 
problems. If a firm chooses to increase its leverage ratio, managers will be more 
disciplined through regular interest payments and instalments of the principle 
amount. Furthermore, constant dividend payments are widely acknowledged as a 
solution to maintain managerial discipline and reduce agency costs as shareholders 
recognise dividends as a way of punishing managers, who will now have reduced 
free cash flow. Easterbrook (1984) suggests that regular dividend payments force 
firms to finance externally. The investment banker or other creditors will closely look 
at the actual status of the firms when new securities are issued, acting as a monitor 
for their own interests. Paying out dividends helps reduce the agent costs since the 
improved monitoring disciplines managers to operate in the way of value-
maximizing. In addition to the aforementioned, the free cash flow hypothesis implies 
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that dividend policy and the investment decision are interconnected. Therefore, an 
increase in dividend payments will reduce the overinvestment problem, which will 
have a positive impact on the market value of the firm, ceteris paribus (Lang & 
Litzenberger, 1989). By and large, agency theory leads to a prediction that ejecting 
the free cash flow to investors reduces agency costs and in turn adds value to firms. 
 
 
Mixed empirical evidence exists as to whether dividends are successful in reducing 
agency costs among the firm‘s stakeholders. This is not unexpected given that 
agency costs are not directly observable and difficult to relate with a firm‘s dividend 
policy. Nonetheless, Allen and Michaely (2003) conclude that both dividends and 
repurchases seem to be paid to reduce potential overinvestment by management, 
which is an agency costs argument. Leary and Michaely (2011) argue that empirical 
data of US industrial firms provide more support for the models based on agency 
costs of free cash flows. Manos (2002) studied agency theory by examining 661 non-
financial companies listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange. His findings followed the 
cost minimization model and the agency theory rationale for dividend policy. Having 
read the empirical evidence in the aforementioned, one can conclude that the 
payment of dividends serves as a mechanism to mitigate the agency problem 
between managers and shareholders and aligns their interests by reducing the 
discretionary funds available to managers. However, in practice, dividend pay-out is 
almost never of sufficient magnitude to become a constraining or disciplining factor 
(DeAngelo et al., 1996).  Brav et al. (2005) finds no evidence indicating that pay-out 
is being used to self-impose discipline. In fact, 87% of managers think that the 
discipline imposed by dividends is not an important factor affecting dividend policy. 
 
    
2.12.2 The Agency Theory of Share Repurchases 
Share repurchases are a fundamental feature of the process a firm undergoes from 
growth phase to a more mature phase. Normally, in a growth phase, a firm has many 
positive NPV projects available, high capital expenditures, low free cash flows, and 
high earnings growth. At some point, the firm‘s growth slows down and its economic 
profits declines. In this phase, capital expenditures decline, and the firm generates 
larger amounts of free cash flows. The agency theory implies that if there is excess 
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cash flow under management‘s control, the company will enter new negative NPV 
projects which destroy the company value. Therefore, management should distribute 
this excess cash to the shareholders instead of entering into new negative NPV 
projects (Grullon and Michaely, 2004). Lie (2000) argues that large incremental 
distributions of cash through special dividends and share repurchases help mitigate 
the agency problems associated with excess cash flows. In addition, (Grullon and 
Michaely, 2004) state that repurchasing firms reduce their current level of capital 
expenditures and Research and Development expenses. Furthermore, the level of 
cash reserves on their balance sheet declines significantly. Nohel and Tarhan (1998) 
find supporting evidence for the free-cash-flow explanation. Therefore, Distribution 
policies that enable companies to deploy excess cash flow serve to prevent 
managerial self-interest and protect shareholder wealth (Grullon & Ikenberry, 2000). 
They also increase the need for companies to rely on external finance for future 
investments, and thus increase the monitoring of managers by these external 
stakeholders. According to Fenn and Liang (2007), firms with high levels of excess 
cash flow and low marginal financing costs will repurchase more shares. Firms with 
high levels of excess cash flow are at greater risk of overinvesting, and hence, derive 
greater benefits from distributing cash to shareholders.  
 
  
As previously mentioned, transferring cash to shareholders by share repurchase 
diminishes the amount of cash in the company. The lower level of cash encourages 
management to better utilise the money left in the company (Jensen 1986). In the 
previous paragraph it was mentioned that: in the maturity stage, the firm‘s growth 
slows down and its economic profits declines. In this phase, capital expenditures 
decline, and the firm generates larger amounts of free cash flows. If this is the case, 
one might ask that if investment opportunities decline, why the market should react 
positively to share repurchases (Grullon, Michaely, 2004). Jensen (1986) explains 
that the positive market reaction to such events is due to the fact these events 
reduce the amount of free cash flows at management‘s disposal. The market is 
already aware of the reduction in profitable investments. An interesting point to note 
though is that even in the absence of agency costs, in situations where companies 
have free cash flows with few investment opportunities, distribution programmes that 
return excess capital to investors are valuable in that they enable investors to 
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reinvest their funds in alternative activities that generate a return higher than 
companies are able to achieve (Grullon & Ikenberry, 2000). Therefore from the 
empirical evidence highlighted in the previous paragraphs, one gets a sense that 
share repurchases add value to investors. If they don‘t result in an increase in the 
share value, they enable investors to invest their funds in firms that are at the growth 
stage and have projects with positive NPV values.  
 
 
2.13 The Wealth Effects of  Share Repurchases on Shareholders  
There are a number of possible reasons as to why companies undertake share buy-
backs. One of these reasons is that share repurchases can be utilised as a tool for 
transferring wealth to various stakeholders. Shares that are repurchased at a 
premium (non-greenmail repurchases) can be modelled as signals, while other 
repurchases are mere wealth transfers between the company and the selling 
shareholders, the extent of which is determined by the relative bargaining power of 
the seller and the repurchasing firm (Lamba and Ramsey, 2000). According to 
Vermaelen and Peyer (2005), wealth is transferred to the sellers in greenmail share 
buy-backs. Although managers who are often significant shareholders, lose by 
discounting the shares these losses are compensated by private benefits from 
control. In the study conducted by Morscheck (2014) it was concluded that: when 
participating shareholders are defined as institutions or individuals, an average 
wealth transfer to the non-participating institution is in the amount of 1%, 1.2%, and 
4% of pre-transaction market-cap over the 6, 12, and 60 month period following a 
share repurchase. Therefore, non-greenmail premium and discounted repurchases 
are followed by positive abnormal returns in the year after the repurchase event. 
 
 
 Share buy-backs have also been known to result in a wealth transfer from 
bondholders or creditors to the non-participating shareholders because the 
increased debt used to finance the buy-back reduces the assets of the company and 
therefore the value of the claims of the creditors. In the study conducted by Dann 
(1981) and Maxwell and Stephens (2003) it was found that firms repurchase their 
shares in order to transfer wealth from bondholders to shareholders. According to 
this theory, share repurchases distribute cash to shareholders thus reducing the 
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cash flow available to cover the interest and principle payment for bondholders, 
which may lead to a higher probability of default on the bonds and a wealth transfer 
from bondholders to shareholders. However, the signalling theory suggests that the 
managers repurchase shares to signal that: the current share price is undervalued 
by the market. In this case, both shareholders and bondholders benefit from 
repurchase events and thus both share and bond prices should have a positive 
reaction on share repurchases (Zhu & Rong, 2012).  The study conducted by 
Nishikawa (2003) finds empirical evidence that supports the aforementioned. 
Through the use of the Bond Database belonging to Lehman Brothers, the author 
found that there were significant negative excess bond returns during the open 
market share repurchase event month, however during the same period the share 
price reaction was significantly positive. Therefore, the bondholders and 
shareholders benefited considerably from the share buy-backs.  
 
 
In addition to the above mentioned, the paper written by Minnick and Zhao (2006)  
introduces the concept of high growth firms making use of levered repurchases as a 
way of funding repurchases when they are cash poor. This view confirms the 
signalling theory, and suggests that firms may use levered repurchases to indicate 
private information to the market when traditional financing methods are closed to 
them. However, the costs of the increased probability of default outweigh the 
signalling benefits from the repurchase. The authors continue by stating that levered 
repurchases have five times as many downgrades in credit rating compared to 
unlevered repurchases, which is consistent with the wealth transfer hypothesis. 
Therefore, share repurchases generate concern that the bond stake may drop in 
value following this act. The company seeking to preserve the value of its bond 
stake, would try to prevent the repurchase from happening and, if it takes place, 
would be watchful to prevent a wealth transfer from bondholders to equity holders 
(Bodnaruk, Massa & Simonov, 2009). Bond covenants have been used by 
bondholders to minimize their potential losses. However, covenants do not eliminate 
the possible wealth losses of bondholders due to shareholders' actions (Nishikawa, 
2003). Vermaelen (1981) argues that most bond covenants put limits on repurchases 
in the same way as they put restrictions on dividend payments. Nevertheless, if a 
reduction in assets (or available cash flows) is large enough, which is typically the 
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case in share repurchases, there could be a greater possibility of default on the 
bonds and wealth could be transferred to shareholders from bondholders.  
 
 
An interesting argument raised by Myers (1977), states that once a firm adds risky 
debt to its capital structure, it introduces a series of financial obligations, legal 
constraints, and enticements which that can cause clashes between managers, 
shareholders and debt holders. Therefore, in a firm with risky debt in its capital 
structure, managers acting in the interest of shareholders may reject positive net 
present value investment opportunities because of these legal constraints. This 
underinvestment or debt overhang problem occurs when a positive net present value 
project decreases the value of equity because some of the value created goes to the 
debt holders. Nonetheless, in instances where a firm‘s existing debt structure causes 
deviations from its optimal investment policy, firms may attempt to renegotiate the 
terms of debt in order to resolve conflicts between security holders. 
 
 
According to Julio (2013), allowing the shareholders to repurchase debt prior to 
maturity maximizes bondholder wealth across feasible strategies. If bondholders 
prohibit repurchases, the owners of the firm will not invest in the projects and the 
value of debt will fall to its minimum value. Thus, it is in the best interest of the 
bondholders (as a group) to allow repurchases and thus encourage more efficient 
investment policies. While bondholders may benefit as a group, if the firm 
repurchases a portion of outstanding debt, each individual bondholder may have an 
incentive to hold on to the debt since the value of their remaining bonds increases 
following the repurchase. In closing, it is important to note that: firms are inclined to 
repurchase debt when expected transfers to bondholders are high, even after 
controlling for leverage. In addition, the announcement of debt repurchases appears 
to be interpreted as good news to shareholders, as event returns are significantly 
positive. 
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2.14 Share Repurchases: A Tool for Changing Capital Structure and 
Ownership Concentration  
Share repurchases are an important financial policy instrument that affects multiple 
corporate decisions like: pay-out, capital structure, investments and management 
compensation policies. Companies tend to use share repurchases as a tool to 
change their capital structure. Therefore, one may find firms with additional debt 
capacity repurchasing their own shares so as to achieve an optimum capital 
structure (Dittmar, 2000).  According to Li and McNally (2007), the optimal leverage 
is the industry average debt ratio, so the optimal capital structure is the industry 
average debt to total asset ratio. Firms below the optimal capital structure 
repurchase their shares to increase leverage, benefit of taxes and increase firm 
value. Interestingly, the study conducted by Pacheco and Raposo (2007) found that 
there was a significantly lower leverage of initial repurchase firms relative to non and 
secondary repurchase firms. This finding may have been related to the existence of 
free cash flows problems, mentioned in the previous paragraphs, or concerns over 
the increased risk of financial problems prevent highly leveraged firms from 
repurchasing shares for the first time.  
 
 
An important point to mention is that companies repurchasing their shares in order to 
distribute them among employees do not change the number of shares outstanding. 
Instead, the number of listed shares diminishes. The level of equity is temporarily 
lowered as long as the company holds its own shares (until their resale or 
distribution). Repurchasing shares in order to distribute them among employees; 
means that company wants to change the ownership structure. However, 
repurchasing shares to distribute them among employees, cannot change the 
company‘s capital structure or improve financial ratios (Bukalska, 2014).Why then do 
companies repurchase shares only to re-distribute them to employees? When the 
controlling shareholders have high ownership, their interests are more closely 
aligned with that of other shareholders. This is in line with a story in which firms with 
dispersed ownership have a stronger incentive to disgorge cash to mitigate agency 
costs related to free cash. Furthermore, employee share options increase the 
flexibility of a firm‘s cost structure. For example cost which lack access to capital, 
may use shares to compensate employees in order to conserve cash. Employee 
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share options also better align the incentives of a firm‘s employees with its owners or 
shareholders. Finally, employee share options enhance the incentives for productive 
behaviour throughout the entire firm (Voss, 2012).  
 
 
According to the management share incentives hypothesis, Fenn and Liang (2001) 
find evidence that managers substitute repurchases for dividends to increase the 
value of their share options. More specifically, they find a strong negative 
relationship between dividend pay-outs and managers‘-options and a positive 
relationship between repurchase activity and share options. Their main interpretation 
of this finding is that managers will have motivations to reduce dividends and 
increase repurchases (or retain more cash) because the value of the managers 
share options are negatively related to expected future dividend payments. Lambert, 
Lanen and Larcker (1989) find that, when a firm decides to pay a cash dividend the 
price of the share will approximately decline by the amount of the dividend on the ex-
dividend date.  In the study conducted by Murphy (1998) it was found that out of 618 
large companies that granted share options to their chief executive officers, only 7 
had plans that included dividend protection. Similarly, Weisbenner (2000) reported 
that in his sample of 799 companies that granted share options, only 2 offered 
dividend protection. Therefore it can be concluded that repurchases are more likely 
to take place when executives have share options. An interesting point, which was 
mentioned in the previous paragraph, is that of share repurchases and ownership.  
 
 
Although a repurchase, at a general level, is merely an alternative mechanism for the 
firm to distribute cash, it also changes the composition of assets held by the firm, the 
financing mix and alters the ownership proportions of the remaining shareholders. 
Jensen (1986) suggested that share repurchases can help reduce the probability of 
incurring agency costs related to free cash. Similarity share repurchases can also 
help improve the governance of the firm. For example, in firms where there is 
insufficient monitoring of management, a repurchase may change the ownership 
composition such that the incentives to monitor management become greater for 
some shareholders if their proportional cash-flow rights and voting rights increase 
(Skjeltorp & Odegaard, 2004). Furthermore, in firms where controlling families have 
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weak control rights, the firm might engage in share repurchases so as to strengthen 
the control positions of the families and secure their future private benefits (Joh & 
Ko, 2007). Nevertheless, it should be noted that share repurchases have the 
possibility of intensifying the conflict between large shareholders and minority 
shareholders.  If large shareholders have stronger incentives to becoming informed, 
a share repurchase may be used to increase their ownership (and the remaining 
shareholders ownership) in an undervalued company by retaining their shares, or 
alternatively decrease their ownership in an overvalued company at the expense of 
less informed owners (Brennan & Thakor, 1990).  Moreover, share repurchases also 
contribute to the conflict between inside- and outside owners since insiders have 
incentives to secure their position in the firm. By repurchasing shares from the 
owners with the lowest valuations (Bagwell, 1991) they increase the cost to a bidding 
firm. Thus, a repurchase can be used to reduce the probability of a value creating 
takeover occurring, which would benefit shareholders, but potentially make the 
manager lose control over the firms resources (Skjeltorp & Odegaard, 2004). 
 
 
2.15 Share Repurchases and Takeover Deterrence 
Studies of share buy-backs have been an integral part of financial research. In 
particular, the use of share repurchases to deter unwanted takeovers has been 
studied extensively in both theoretical and empirical literature. According to Doan, 
Yap and Gannon (2012), there are five main hypotheses that explain a firm‘s 
takeover likelihood. They are the inefficient management hypothesis, the size 
hypothesis, the market–to-book ratio hypothesis, the growth and resource mismatch 
hypothesis, and the industry disturbance hypothesis. The inefficient management 
argument is based on the fundamental theory in corporate finance, whereby the 
takeover market or the market for corporate control is an external monitoring 
mechanism for management performance. If managers are unable to maximise the 
value of the firm, a better management team will replace them. The size hypothesis 
effect is associated with the transaction cost in a takeover announcement. It is 
maintained that larger firms tend to have a lower takeover likelihood compared with 
smaller firms, since the associated transaction costs for taking over large firms are 
much higher when compared to those of small firms (Palepu 1986). The relevant 
transaction costs include not only the acquisition cost which the acquirer initially pays 
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for the target firm, but also costs associated with the absorption of the target firm into 
the acquirer‘s organisation. The market-to-book ratio hypothesis states that a firm 
with a low market-to-book ratio is more likely to become a takeover target. Since the 
book value of the firm is not fully reflected in the market value, firms with low market-
to-book ratios are considered a good investment opportunity.  
 
 
An additional trigger of a firm takeover is the mismatch between a firm‘s future 
growth and its available resources. Billett (1996) states that two types of firms are 
more likely to have such an imbalance and both are found to be appealing to 
potential acquirers in the market. The first type includes young firms, which may 
have very high potential future growth but do not have enough resources, or the 
required capital might be too costly to finance their projects. The second type 
consists of mature firms that have excess cash-in-hand or comparatively easy 
access to low-cost capital. However, at the mature stage of the business cycle, firms 
of this nature do not have many profitable investment opportunities. Finally, the 
industry disturbance hypothesis, proposed by Gort (1969), suggests that takeover 
waves might be triggered by the difference in valuation perceived among market 
participants and as such clustered by industry. The valuation differential could be 
initiated by economic shocks in the market such as a change in technology, policy 
frameworks, or industrial structure. A factor that might signal a firm‘s takeover 
likelihood is the recent takeover history within its particular industry. 
 
 
Share repurchases undertaken as a defence against hostile takeovers can come in 
one of two forms. First, it could be a targeted or negotiated share repurchase of one 
shareholder who has acquired a substantial shareholding in the company and is 
threatening a hostile takeover. The second form is a general share buy-back which 
can operate as a takeover defence by reducing the number of shares available to the 
hostile offeror. However, several empirical studies have concluded that the general 
share repurchase undertaken as a takeover defence (excluding targeted buy-backs), 
is not in the interests of the shareholders of target companies. As a matter of fact, a 
study of 49 defensive share repurchase events made by companies in the United 
States of America, over the period 1980-1987, found that the event of defensive 
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share buy-backs was associated with an average negative impact on the share price 
of the target companies. 
 
 
On the contrary, the results for negotiated or targeted share buy-backs are mixed. In 
principle, these types of buy-backs either harm or benefit non-participating 
shareholders. On the one hand, it may be desirable for the company to repurchase 
the shares of an individual shareholder where that shareholder is disrupting or 
threatening to disturb the operation of the company. On the other hand, managers 
may buy-back the shares of an individual shareholder to entrench themselves 
against a hostile takeover that otherwise would be commenced by the shareholder. 
This may not be in the interest of shareholders where they are denied the right to 
consider the takeover offer (Lamba & Ramsay, 2000). 
 
 
 An interesting point to note is that there are numerous reasons why share 
repurchases deter potential takeovers. Distributing excess cash to shareholders may 
alleviate agency problems, thus reducing gains from a takeover. Moreover, the 
model offered by Hirshleifer and Thakor (1992), shows that managers of poor 
performing firms act to deter takeovers by increasing leverage during periods of high 
takeover activity. For debt-financed repurchases, increased leverage may provide an 
additional deterrent to the would-be acquirer. Finally, Bagwell (1991) shows that 
share repurchases deter takeovers and help protect incumbents from takeover 
attempts by raising share prices for corporate raiders to pay. Empirical evidence 
shows that takeover activity declines significantly after Dutch auctions. A Dutch 
auction share repurchase is a method whereby the firm announces the number of 
shares it will repurchase within a stated range of prices. Investors then indicate the 
price within the stated range of prices at which they are willing to tender their shares. 
Upon expiration of the tender offer, the firm identifies the minimum price at which the 
pre-specified number of shares may be repurchased. Using a logistic regression 
model, the study conducted Persons (1994) found that the Dutch auction repurchase 
method was more likely to be adopted by large companies that were previously 
subject to takeover pressure and have low inside ownership. The first firm to utilise 
the Dutch auction was Todd Shipyards in 1981 (Bagwell,1992). However in more 
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recent years companies such as: The Wendy‘s Company, KCG Holdings and 
Information Services Group have also utilised Dutch auction tender offers (The 
Wendy‘s Company, 2014; KCG Holdings, 2015 & Information Services Group, 2016)  
 
 
While share buy backs may deter takeover activity, some theoretical models suggest 
that managers can use repurchases to pursue their own objectives. For example, if 
there is asymmetric information between the manager and outside shareholders, a 
repurchase can be used to: increase the manager‘s ownership in the undervalued 
firm and transfer wealth from outside owners to the manager and the remaining 
shareholders. In addition, share repurchases have the probability of decreasing 
value enhancing takeovers which benefit shareholders, but threaten the position of 
the manager and make him lose control over the firm‘s resources (Skjeltorp and 
Odegaarsd, 2004). Therefore, takeovers are one of the most important external 
mechanisms for aligning the interests of managers and shareholders.  
 
 
Jensen (1993) finds that corporate governance worsens as the threat of a takeover 
decreases, since alternative governance mechanisms are likely to be less effective 
in disciplining managers. Consistent with this view, Mikkelson and Partch (1997) find 
that the propensity to fire Chief Executive Officers that are performing poorly, 
becomes weaker during the years in which takeover activity was low (1984-1988 
versus 1989-1993). According to Shleifer and Vishny (1997), replacing poor 
performing Chief Executive Officers is a necessary condition for good corporate 
governance. Jensen (1986) and others have introduced an interesting point of view, 
where they stated that mergers represent a mechanism for: shifting assets into their 
best use and ensures that managers act in the shareholders' interest. In fact the 
rationale behind enacting legislation that promotes Merges and Acquisitions 
includes: capital allocation, increasing minority shareholder protection and 
transparency as takeovers can lead to good corporate governance and provide rapid 
access to new markets and new product lines (Garrett, 2010). In addition to the 
aforementioned, the study conducted by Martynova and Renneboog (2006) finds 
that the share price increases significantly before and after an official announcement 
of a takeover bid. When such a price increase occurs, the shareholders are able to 
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sell their shares at a much higher price than they would have had the takeover not 
taken place.  
 
 
Given that takeovers offer gains to shareholders, defences adopted by the board 
against a takeover would be seen as being against the interests of the target 
company‘s shareholders. Therefore, attempts to defeat a takeover causes 
shareholders to miss out on an opportunity to gain from selling their shares to a 
bidder, who offers them a premium over the current market share price of the target 
company (Pearce & Robinson, 2004). On the contrary, many studies have argued 
that the share price increase before and after an official announcement of a takeover 
bid, is a short-term boost that does not last (Sudarsanam, 1995). Furthermore, the 
main beneficiaries in Mergers and Acquisitions are the managers of the acquiring 
business and the shareholders of the target company (Bootle, 2009). Knoeber 
(1986) states that takeover defences benefit the shareholders because they provide 
managers with the security of not being taken over on the near future. As a result, 
directors can focus their efforts on long-term investments. He continues by stating 
that managers receive financial compensations for their performances once the 
benefits of their work have been assessed. As a consequence, shareholders have to 
make sure that there is no risk for the company to be taken over, otherwise the 
managers would never receive their wages and therefore have no incentive to work 
harder under the threat of a tender offer. Therefore, takeover defences are essential 
in helping managers to focus the on long-term investments and on the best interests 
of the shareholders.  
 
 
Having read the conflicting views on takeovers, it becomes clear that the idea of 
share repurchases being a mechanism for deterring takeovers is more complex than 
it seems. Takeovers in general are perceived to be a fundamental part of healthy 
capitalism. They keep good businesses performing well, ensure that capital is 
allocated properly and managers remain committed to the best interests of investors 
(Fama, 1980). However, changing financial and economic circumstances, in 
conjunction with a number of recent controversial takeovers, have led to the criticism 
of takeover activity (Davis, Offenbach, Stevens & Grant, 2013). Share repurchases 
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done in order to deter takeover activity, do not only lead to an increase in the share 
price but they also allow managers to focus on projects that are in the best interest of 
shareholders Knoeber (1986). Moreover, the use of anti-takeover amendments in an 
early stage of the firm history, just after an Initial Public Offerings for instance, 
protects its management and makes sure that the core directors of the company will 
remain in place long enough to continue the long-term investments necessary for the 
continued existence of the company Field & Karpoff, 2002). While there may not be 
an answer as to which school of thought prevails, it is important to note that the issue 
of utilising share buybacks as a method of deterring takeover activity depends on: 
whether shareholders prefer to remove non-performing managers so as to re-build 
an organisation that performs at its optimum level, or whether they prefer to keep 
these incumbents and have them under constant pressure of a takeover. 
 
   
2.16 A South African Perspective of Share Repurchases 
South African companies have been allowed by law (No. 37 of 1999) to repurchase 
their own shares since 1 July 1999 (Bester, Wesson & Hamman, 2010). Prior to this 
Act, companies were not allowed to repurchase their own shares. South African 
share repurchases started off slow due to uncertainty regarding the treatment of 
repurchases under tax laws, nonetheless once the tax implications had been clarified 
and companies became familiar with this new distribution mechanism, repurchase 
programmes were initiated by many listed companies (Daly, 2002). From the period 
2000 to 2003, Bhana (2007) reported 117 open market repurchase events. In a more 
recent study conducted by Bester (2008) it was found that 121 companies, listed on 
the JSE, had made 312 repurchase events from the period July 1999 to June 2007. 
The figures shown above are strong indications of there being an increasing 
movement (in the world of share markets) towards adopting share repurchase 
activity. These growing numbers raise an interesting issue regarding the motivation 
behind share repurchases. Research papers show that firms buy back shares for 
numerous reasons such as: management‘s intention to signal to the market that the 
shares are undervalued, to distribute cash to shareholders, to ward off potential 
takeover raiders, to distribute excess cash when there are no profitable investment 
opportunities, to adjust financial leverage and to avoid dilution (Lee et al., 2010). 
However, in certain instances the reasons stated in international studies do not 
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always conform to those obtained in South African studies. Notable South African 
studies on the information-signalling hypothesis of open market share repurchases 
were performed by Daly (2002), Bhana (2007), Pienaar and Krige (2012). Bhana 
(2007) found that the South African market reaction to open market share 
repurchase events was similar to that experienced in the United States of America. 
Companies repurchasing their shares signal undervaluation to the market.  
 
 
In contrast to managers in the United States, who consider repurchases a 
significantly more flexible (and thus more attractive) form of repaying capital to 
investors, South African managers felt the same way about repurchases, but had a 
stronger preference for dividends as a way of returning cash to their shareholders. 
Interestingly, managers in the United States and South Africa did not agree with the 
statement that their repurchase decisions were guided by a desire to resist a 
potential takeover. Nonetheless, they both agreed that their share repurchase 
decisions were affected by: the dilutionary effects of employee share option schemes 
and the fact that share options were not dividend protected. In conclusion it was 
found that both groups of managers viewed dividends and share repurchases as 
compliments and not substitutes. The only difference between the managers was the 
best alternative use of funds. Managers in the United States preferred to run down 
debt while South African managers preferred to focus on merger and acquisition 
activities (Firer et al., 2008).  
 
 
The South African share repurchase environment consists of two methods of 
repurchasing shares: namely repurchases under general authority (general 
repurchases) and repurchases under specific authority (specific repurchases). 
General repurchases are similar in style to those of American open market share 
repurchases (Daly, 2002). Regulations on general (or open market) repurchases are 
more flexible and less cumbersome than specific repurchases, and it is expected 
that companies would show a preference for open market repurchases over specific 
share repurchases (Wesson et al., 2014).  Bester et al. (2010) found that the South 
African share repurchase environment does however differ from the international 
environment therefore; international studies cannot be applied pari passu on South 
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African share repurchases. In arriving to this conclusion, the authors used a sample 
of 33 JSE-listed companies, which were studied over nine years, from July 1999 until 
2008. The findings obtained showed that South African open market repurchases 
represent about 61% of total share repurchases in value and only about 49% of open 
market repurchases in value are announced via the Securities Exchange News 
Service (SENS) of the JSE. The listing requirements of the JSE propose that: once a 
company has cumulatively repurchased 3% of the original number of shares in issue, 
at the time that the general authority from shareholders was granted, and for each 
3% in aggregate of the original number of shares acquired after the first 3%, it must 
make a SENS announcement regarding the prescribed holdings. This JSE 
requirement applies to general repurchases only. In relation to specific repurchases, 
it is suggested that as soon as a company has determined the terms of a 
repurchase, it should make a SENS announcement accordingly. Therefore if only 
half of the share repurchases are announced via SENS then, previous research has 
only dealt with half of the total share repurchases in South Africa. Furthermore, it will 
be difficult to do additional research on share repurchases in South Africa since 
existing data sources do not include unannounced share repurchases Wesson 
(2015). The South African share repurchase environment does however present an 
interesting and unique feature, which pertains to the subsidiaries of companies being 
able to repurchase the holding company‘s shares (up to 10% in total), this includes 
share trusts. Other countries only permit share repurchases of own shares by the 
holding company and prohibit share repurchases of the holding company‘s shares by 
subsidiaries and share trusts (Bester et al., 2010). In the case of repurchases by a 
subsidiary of a holding company, Secondary Tax on Companies (STC) was not 
payable as STC is no longer in existence in South Africa. Therefore, companies are 
encouraged to repurchase their own shares through a subsidiary rather than buying 
back the shares directly (Madubela, 2011).  
 
 
In the research conducted by Wesson (2015), it was revealed that the rate at which 
companies are prepared to dish out money to buy back their own shares is picking 
up dramatically in South Africa. In the 10 years covered by this research, money 
spent on share repurchases has increased from R2.7 billion in 2000 to R26 billion in 
2009. The splurge on share repurchases raises an interesting question of the 
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traditional role of share exchanges, which has always been to provide companies 
with funds to invest. Adding share repurchases to the R247 billions of dividends paid 
out to shareholders over the 10 year period covered by the aforementioned 
research, suggests that companies listed on the JSE distribute more funds to 
investors than they receive from them Wesson (2015).   
 
 
Nonetheless, the most disturbing aspect of the research conducted by Wesson 
(2015) was the difficulty experienced in trying to get reliable data. The writer 
contends that South Africa‘s disclosure requirements are especially lax compared to 
other jurisdictions that allow share repurchases. The JSE‘s lax and poorly monitored 
requirements saw repurchases sometimes announced years after they had been 
undertaken and in almost half of the open market repurchases, no announcements 
were made. The aforementioned is the reason why there have been so few studies 
conducted on share repurchases in South Africa. Since Wesson‘s (2015) study, 
there have been amendments to the JSE‘s listing requirements, to ensure greater 
disclosure of share repurchase activity undertaken during a financial year. The new 
Companies Act makes repurchasing shares easier as it has removed the need for 
shareholder approval. However, in terms of the JES listings requirements, JSE listed 
companies do have to secure shareholder approval (Smith, 2016) 
 
 
The aim of the study at hand is to examine the market‘s reaction to share 
repurchases of companies listed on the JSE. Previous studies show that share 
repurchase events are associated with positive Average Abnormal Returns and 
positive Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (Punwasi, 2012). These findings are 
indicative of an ‗announcement effect‘ and provide support for the signalling theory. 
An interesting observation however, is that of the managers using share repurchases 
as a tool for stabilising a company‘s share price which has been following a 
downward trend for many consecutive days. While the aforementioned may be an 
excellent strategy; Isa, Ghani and Lee (2011) state that managers should not signal 
under-pricing or make an effort to stabilise the price until there is a long enough 
period of consecutive declines in the price. In a more recent study conducted by 
Wesson et al. (2014), results showed that in the three months prior to the event of a 
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share repurchase, the shares were relatively stable with a negative Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns (CAR) of between -1% and 0%. In the period around the event 
date, the CAR increased by about 1 %, but this was not statistically significant. The 
CAR did however drop by 2% between (T+10) and (T+22), but this again was not 
statistically significant. From (T+50) a steady increase in the CAR, which reached a 
maximum of about 35% (for the equal-weighted sample) and 48% (for the weighted 
sample), was observed. In conclusion, the study found a much higher positive 
abnormal return than had been observed in prior international research conducted by 
authors such as: Ikenberry et al. (1995), Vermaelen (1981), and Lakonishok & 
Vermaelen (1990). The positive abnormal return was mainly confined to value 
shares, which showed an abnormal return of about 80% after about two-and-a-half 
years, before subsiding. This study therefore confirms that investment decisions 
based on open market share repurchase events, especially in respect of value 
shares, have earned significant abnormal returns for a period of about three years 
following to the event date. Investors should therefore take advantage of the 
informational value of open market share repurchase events.  
 
 
An important point to note is that, repurchase announcements without follow through 
are not an effective and costless tool for boosting share prices as investors learn 
from past experiences about managerial motives of such announcements. Bhana 
(2007) suggests that managers should provide shareholders with a detailed 
explanation of future benefits likely to arise from a share repurchase program as it 
will eradicate any form of sceptism associated with a share repurchase program.  
 
 
2.17 A South African Perspective on Dividend Policy 
Over the past few years, numerous studies have been conducted on South African 
dividend policy. Empirical evidence found by Firer, Gilbert and Maytham (2008) 
showed that South African managers held similar attitudes to those in the study 
conducted by Lintner (1956) that is, targeting a pay-out ratio and being conservative 
when setting dividends. In support of the above mentioned, Seneque and Gourley 
(1983) showed that managers took current and future earnings into account, when 
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setting a dividend policy. Managers would not amend the dividend policy unless they 
were certain that they could maintain the new level (Marx, 2001).  
 
 
Theories on South African dividend policy are extremely thought-provoking and 
diverse. The paper presented by Wolff and Auret (2009) focuses on whether 
dividend changes in South Africa, signal a change in earnings. The results found in 
this study are particularly interesting as they are the foundation of the study at hand. 
According to these theorists, dividend and earnings announcements are made on 
the same day in South Africa, therefore when current dividends are high, current 
earnings will also be high. However, there was no evidence of future increases in 
earnings after dividend increases. Even after applying several models in order to 
give signalling a chance to be observed, there was still no evidence of signalling. 
Therefore, it can be said that managers in South Africa do not use dividends to 
signal future earnings (Wolff & Auret, 2009). Furthermore, markets do not respond to 
dividend announcements but to earnings announcements (Ooms et al., 1987). There 
seems to be inadequate support for the signalling theory. While most managers 
believe that dividends convey information to the market, the majority of managers 
state that they would never use dividends to send a signal about future earnings 
(Firer et al., 2008).  
 
 
2.18 Are Dividends Disappearing Globally 
The dividend puzzle is a conundrum. For many years researchers have investigated 
the rationale behind the payment of dividends. Firms that pay dividends are at a 
competitive disadvantage since they have a higher cost of equity than firms that do 
not pay. Furthermore, dividends are taxed at a higher rate than capital gains 
therefore they are less valuable than capital gains. Fama and French (2001) study 
the commonness of dividend payers listed on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ, 
during the period 1926 to 1999. Their study shows that the percentage of firms 
paying dividends declines sharply after 1978. In 1973, 52.8% of publicly traded non-
financial and non-utility firms pay dividends. The proportion of payers rises to a peak 
of 66.5% in 1978. It then falls persistently in 1999, where only 20.8% of the firms pay 
dividends. The decline in the frequency of dividend payers is in part due to an 
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increasing tilt of publicly traded firms toward the characteristics of non-dividend 
payers (small size, low earnings, and large investments relative to earnings). This 
change in the nature of publicly traded firms was driven by a flood in new listings 
after 1978 and by the changing nature of new lists. Prior to 1978, newly listed 
companies had strong investment opportunities (high asset growth rates and high 
market value of assets relative to book value) and were more profitable. Post 1978 
the surge in new lists and their changing characteristics, produced a growth of 
smaller companies with: low profitability, strong investment opportunities and a 
culture of no dividend pay-outs.  
 
 
Maung and Mehrotra (2011) offer a simple rational explanations based on two 
contemporaneous trends over the Fama and French (2001) examination period. The 
first is a sustained increase in the information content of share prices, thus lessening 
the relative benefit of costly signalling through dividends. The second trend is the 
tremendous growth in indexing that has occurred over the last three decades. Under 
the assumption that indexers care primarily about tracking error, their demand for 
idiosyncratic information may have also declined. Baker and Wurgler (2004b) use 
the same methodology of Fama and French (2001), to describe the evolution of the 
propensity to pay dividends from 1963 through to 2000. In addition the authors 
question whether the catering view of dividends in Baker and Wurgler (2004a) sheds 
light on the propensity to pay dividends. They find that there are four distinct trends 
in the propensity to pay dividends between the periods 1963 to 2000, two 
appearances and two disappearances. The post-1977 decline is by far the largest 
and longest, but the three earlier fluctuations are also evident. The second main 
finding shows that each of these four trends is associated with a corresponding 
fluctuation in a proxy for catering incentives, the share market dividend premium. 
This variable is measured annually and defined as the: log difference in the value-
weighted average market-to-book of payers and the value-weighted average market-
to-book of nonpayers. The dividend premium is positive in the mid-1960s, coinciding 
with the first (increasing) trend in the propensity to pay dividends. It then falls through 
1969, suggesting a premium for nonpayers, and accurately predicts the start of a 
decreasing trend in dividend pay-outs. The dividend premium becomes positive in 
1970 and remains positive through 1977. Nonetheless, the propensity to pay 
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dividends does not begin until 1973 or 1975. This due to the fact that during the early 
1970s, Nixon‘s Committee on Interest and Dividends actively discouraged dividend 
increases, in an effort to fight inflation. Once this artificial control was cancelled, the 
propensity to pay dividends recommenced, in alignment with catering incentives. 
Interestingly, the dividend premium goes back to negative values in 1978 and 
remains negative through 2000. This predicts the start of a decreasing trend in 
dividend pay-outs. 
 
 
Bildik and Fatemi (2009) examine the pattern of dividend payments and their trend 
over time, in 33 different countries over the period 1985 to 2006. Using data from a 
large sample of more than 17000 firms, these researchers find a considerable 
disparity in the propensity to pay dividends at the global level. However, the common 
trend across these markets is a declining tendency to pay dividends. Over the 22 
years covered by this study, the proportion of payers declines sharply from 87% to 
53%. This decline is persistent and consistent over the sub-periods, and across all 
33 countries studied. Therefore, these findings indicate that there has been a large 
decline in the propensity to pay dividends worldwide. Even though Fama and French 
(2000) carefully state that their findings show a reduction in the number and 
percentage of dividend paying firms, their research is commonly interpreted as 
indicating that dividends themselves are disappearing. The research conducted by 
DeAngelo et al. (2004) confirms the radical transformation in corporate dividend 
practices over the last two decades nonetheless it does not indicate that dividends 
are disappearing. Rather, dividends paid by industrial firms actually increased over 
the period 1978 to 2000. The large reduction in payers occurred almost entirely 
among firms that paid very small dividends. The 25 largest dividend payers, all of 
which were established firms, collectively supplied over half (54.9%) of aggregate 
industrial dividends in the year 2000. 
 
 
Numerous studies have tried to unpack the idea of the disappearing dividend. 
Researchers such as Shapiro and Zhuang (2014), show that firms with lower loss-
aversion investors, tend to not pay dividends. Similarly, managers with higher capital 
gain benefits, like those whose compensation package has a higher share of share 
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options, are also less likely to pay positive dividends. In addition to the 
aforementioned, the authors continue by stating that a higher riskiness of future 
earnings symbolises a higher probability of a future dividend cut, which in turns 
means that the probability of such a firm paying positive dividends is lower. In the 
paper written by Amihud and Li (2002), the disappearing dividend phenomenon is 
partly due to the decline in the information content of dividend announcements. If 
dividends provide investors with less information about the firm‘s value, then given 
that they are costly, firms may refrain from initiating them or from raising them and 
may even reduce them. Furthermore, dividend announcements are becoming less 
informative due to the increase in shareholding by institutional investors, who are 
more sophisticated and informed than average individual investors. Thus, by the time 
the dividend news is announced, the information that it is intended to convey is 
already incorporated in the share price. Accordingly, the disappearing dividends are 
partly a result of the increase in institutional holdings. In certain instances, critics of 
double taxation blame the increasing rarity of dividends on the fact that such pay-
outs are taxed as ordinary income, while capital gains enjoy deferred taxation until 
the share is sold. Furthermore, they are taxed at a much lower rate.Nonetheless, this 
type of thinking is not without fault as the disparity between the taxes has existed for 
years (before and after the 1970s).  
 
 
There are two other trends, which took place in the 1970s, that provide a better 
explanation for the disappearing dividend: the boom in mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A) and the explosion of share options. Shares issued to finance a merger or to 
pay option benefits means there is less money available to pay-out in the form of 
dividends. In fact there is a consensus amongst scholars that the two most recent 
M&A waves have failed to maximize shareholder value. In most cases the acquiring 
companies paid too much (the so-called winner‘s curse). Similarly free cash spent on 
share repurchases was a convenient way of increasing the share price for a chief 
executive waiting to exercise an option however, this money cannot be spent on 
dividends (Kuttner, 2002).  
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Dividends, as a decision of the company, persistently keep the mystery and 
attraction. Till today, it cannot be said that there are exact motivations behind their 
offering or their real effects. Experts‘ opinions are varied as shown in the previous 
sections therefore it is even more difficult to understand the motivations of 
eliminating them. Studies have shown that there is a phenomenon of reducing 
dividends nevertheless it is unlikely that their disappearance will happen. Dividends 
are still an important instrument in the financial sector (Prisacariu & Sandu, 2012). 
  
 
2.19 Dividends, Share Repurchases and the Substitution Hypothesis 
Cash dividends and share repurchases are two major forms of pay out to 
shareholders. For decades companies in the United States have preferred to pay out 
cash in the form of dividends rather than share repurchases, despite the relative tax 
advantage of capital gains over dividends. Nonetheless, share repurchase activity 
has experienced extraordinary growth over the past twenty years. The results of the 
paper written by Fama and French (2001) show that even after controlling for firm 
characteristics, firms now have a lower propensity to pay dividends. Furthermore, 
Grullon and Michaely (2002) highlight the fact that dividend payments have grown at 
an average rate of 7.5 percent per year, while share repurchase volume has grown 
at an average rate of 28.3 percent. The question that comes to mind is: what are the 
reasons for the change in corporate pay out policy? From a tax perspective, there is 
an obvious incentive for companies to substitute dividends with share repurchases, 
as capital gains are taxed at more favourable rates than dividends. Moreover, share 
repurchases allow investors to postpone the realization of capital gains and thus the 
payment of taxes (Grullon & Michaely, 2002).  
 
 
In the paper written by Dhanani and Roberts (2009), the data obtained from the 
United Kingdom indicated that open market share repurchase programs dominate in 
non-investment companies. These repurchase programs are primarily driven by a 
desire to: return excess cash flows to shareholders, influence reported earnings per 
share (EPS) levels, signal undervaluation to capital markets and optimise a 
company‘s gearing ratios. Similarly, investment companies also rely heavily on open 
market share repurchases as well as tender offers. The main factors contributing to 
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the use of share repurchase programs among repurchasing investment companies 
appear to be: the management and discount to Net Asset Value per Share (NAV), 
and the management of market liquidity. When shifting the attention to investors and 
managers, the reasons that attracted more managerial support for share 
repurchases include: capital reallocation in which surplus funds are returned to 
investors in the absence of value enhancing projects, the flexibility of share 
repurchase programs, their substitutability in relation to special dividends, the role 
that share repurchase programs have in influencing corporate gearing levels and 
signalling of undervaluation.  
 
 
On the other hand, the reasons cited by investors include the view that share 
repurchases: enable companies to generate publicity in the markets, influence the 
total future dividend pay-out levels and mitigate the principal agent problem by 
reducing opportunities for management to engage in behaviours which benefit 
themselves at the expense of investors. In addition studies have found that once 
investors realise that dividends are being replaced by repurchases, they view a 
reduction in dividends in a less negative light. Therefore, the market reaction 
surrounding the announcement of a dividend decrease is significantly lowered for 
repurchasing firms than for non-repurchasing firms. Nevertheless, the idea of share 
repurchases being a substitute for dividends is not new. In (1961), authors Miller and 
Modigliani established that share repurchases and dividends were perfect 
substitutes since residual cash could be paid to investors in the form of dividends or 
repurchases, given a particular investment policy. In later studies, authors such as 
Grullon & Michaely (2002) also provided evidence that companiess had indeed been 
substituting dividends with share repurchases. In this particular study results showed 
that the majority of firms initiating cash payments did so through share repurchases 
and those firms that issued dividends, had also started to repurchase shares as well.  
 
 
The study conducted by Firer et al. (2008), found that managers in the United States 
and in South Africa viewed dividends and share repurchases as compliments, not 
substitutes. The only difference between these managers was the best alternative 
use of funds for dividend payments. In the United States managers preferred to run 
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down debt, while in South Africa managers preferred to focus on merger and 
acquisition activities. The argument raised by Firer et al. (2008) opens the discussion 
on dividends, which have a long history dating back to the early sixteenth century in 
Holland and Great Britain when the captains of sixteenth century sailing ships started 
selling financial claims to investors, which entitled them to share in the profits, if any, 
of the voyages. At the end of each voyage, the profits and the capital were 
distributed to investors, liquidating and ending the venture‘s life. By the end of the 
sixteenth century, these financial claims began to be traded on open markets in 
Amsterdam. Nonetheless they were slowly replaced by shares of ownership, which 
caused the ownership structure of shipping firms to evolve. An interesting 
observation was that during this period corporate managers placed high importance 
on stable dividend payments. In a way, this was due to the comparison investors 
made with the other form of financial security then traded, namely government 
bonds. Bonds paid a regular and stable interest payment, and corporate managers 
found that investors favoured shares that performed like bonds (i.e. paid a regular 
and stable dividend). In addition was also believed that dividends contained 
important signalling information. Investors were often faced with inaccurate 
information about the performance of a firm, and used dividend policy as a way of 
evaluating what management‘s views about future performance were. An increase in 
divided payments was generally perceived as being reflective of rising future share 
prices (Malkawi, Rafferty & Pillai, 2010).  
 
 
Today, the world still values dividends differently to share repurchases. In the study 
conducted by DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (2000), the relation between the 
disappearance of special dividends and the appearance of repurchase programs 
was examined. Results showed that there was no evidence that share repurchase 
programs had replaced special dividends; therefore there was no evidence of the 
substitution effect. Furthermore, the findings in the Brav et al. (2005) paper showed 
that managers did not view dividends and share repurchases as one-for-one 
substitutes, therefore it was unlikely that share buy-backs would replace dividends 
as they each fulfil different roles within the organisation. The key difference between 
these methods of distributing cash to shareholders being that shareholders receiving 
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dividend payments receive a return without a trade in exchange, that is, without a 
need to relinquish a part of their shareholding (Dhanani and Roberts, 2009).  
 
 
According to Bhattacharaya (1979), investors actually prefer the bird in the hand of 
cash dividends rather than the two in the bush of future capital gains. In the study 
conducted by Bernheim (1991), it was concluded that management uses dividends 
as opposed to share repurchases, because shareholders may, for example, want 
regular dividend programs because of their heavy reliance on this income. Besides 
increasing dividend payments, ceteris paribus, is associated with increases in share 
value as higher current dividends reduce uncertainty about a firm‘s future cash flows. 
An additional point to note is that in the absence of positive investment projects, 
companies would rather engage in dividend payments (special dividends) to help 
enhance shareholder wealth by enabling them to invest in projects that have positive 
NPV values. Easterbrook (1984) argued that dividends could be used to reduce the 
free cash flow in the hands of managers. Managers‘ interests are not necessarily the 
same as shareholders‘ interests, and in certain instances managers might conduct 
actions that are costly to shareholders, such as consuming excessive perquisites or 
over-investing in managerially rewarding but unprofitable activities. Shareholders 
therefore incur (agency) costs associated with monitoring managers‘ behaviour, and 
these agency costs are an implicit cost resulting from the potential conflict of interest 
among shareholders and corporate managers. The payment of dividends might 
serve to align the interests and mitigate the agency problems between managers 
and shareholders, by reducing the discretionary funds available to managers.  
 
 
The finding by Jagannathan et al. (2000) shows that firms paying dividends have 
more stable earnings than firms that use share repurchases. Therefore, share 
repurchases are used to pay out extraordinary transitory earnings and dividends are 
used to pay-out permanent earnings. In the study conducted by Dhanani and 
Roberts (2009) both managers and investors echoed the fact that repurchase 
programs were a flexible means with which to return surplus cash to investors and 
were similar to special dividends, however they also stated that they had 
reservations about the role of share repurchases in this capacity. Special dividends 
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are more equitable and represent a more certain distribution of resources to 
investors in comparison to share repurchase programs, in which only the sellers 
receive the rewards and there is little certainty associated with these gains. 
Interestingly, in the study performed by Allen et al. (2000) it was argued that firms 
paying dividends were more likely to attract institutional investors. This stems from 
the fact that institutional investors are often subject to restrictions in institutional 
charters (such as the prudent man rule) which to some extent prevents them from 
investing in non-paying or low-dividend shares. Furthermore, these institutions have 
a relative tax advantage over individual investors and as a result are able to 
purchase high dividend paying shares. In the same way, good quality firms prefer to 
attract institutional clienteles (by paying dividends) because institutions are better 
informed than retail investors and have the ability to monitor or detect firm quality. 
Therefore, the clientele effect plays a critical role in the presence of dividends and 
the documented irregularities, such as a reluctance of firms to cut dividends.  
 
 
Dividend payments support the signalling, free cash flow and clientele hypotheses, 
nonetheless, repurchase programs are also used to signal undervaluation in the 
markets and managers are very conscious of their effect on earnings per share. In 
the study conducted by Grullon and Michaely (2002), it was established that the 
propensity of firms to initiate a dividend payment in the 1990s is by order of 
magnitude, smaller than it was in the 1970s. Furthermore, established companies 
now distribute more of their cash flows through repurchases and less through 
dividends. The paper written by Brav et al. (2005) is the latest study to examine the 
role of share repurchases in the United States, as part of a broader study that also 
examined companies‘ dividend policies. In this study, survey results showed that, 
managers were hesitant to shift dollars away from repurchases toward dividends 
because a substitution in this direction is not reversed except under extraordinary 
circumstances. This is mainly due to the fact that dividends are sticky and tied to 
long-term sustainable earnings (Lintner, 1956). The managers continued by 
expressing that they valued the flexibility of repurchases and disliked the rigidity of 
dividends.  
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South African managers felt the same way as American managers, when it came to 
repurchases but they had a stronger preference for dividends than their counterparts 
in the United States (Firer et al., 2008). In relation to executives‘ views on the form of 
pay-out they would choose if they were hypothetically paying out for the first time, 
survey results revealed that, among firms that do not currently pay out, 67% say that 
if they were beginning to pay out they would repurchase only, while 22% say they 
would only pay dividends. The tendency of a decreasing reliance on dividend 
payments and the increasing reliance on repurchases also implies that nowadays, a 
more appropriate tool of valuation is total pay-out rather than dividend pay-out 
(Grullon & Michaely, 2002). A point to note however is that during rising markets, 
investors may be willing to tolerate higher gearing levels, which may make 
repurchase programs popular during such conditions. Conversely, during falling 
markets, managers may be more inclined to return cash to investors to enable them 
to invest it more efficiently and in this case. The aforementioned, reiterates the fact 
that share buy-backs are more flexible then dividends. Mitchell, Dharmawan and 
Clarke (2001) concur with this idea, as they explain that share repurchase programs 
may gain popularity in downward markets since companies may be reluctant to 
distribute cash dividends which subsequently, may have to be reduced. Brennan and 
Thakor (1990) do however point out that share repurchases offer informed investors 
an advantage over uninformed investors. The informed investors will not participate 
in the purchase if they believe the share is undervalued, but will if it is overvalued. 
Therefore, investors should not always be persuaded to sell off their shares every 
time a company makes a share repurchase announcement. Rather, there be an 
investigation as to why the organisation is repurchasing shares in the first place.  
 
 
2.20 Conclusion 
A lot of research has been performed on dividend policy. While studies may have 
examined the various issues pertaining to dividend policy, they have produced mixed 
and inconclusive results. Perhaps the famous statement made by Black (1976) that 
the harder one looks at the dividend picture the more it seems like a puzzle with 
pieces that just do not fit together, is fitting when it comes to dividend policy since 
academic literature is still not clear as to when, why and how companies pay 
dividends, and whether dividends create or destroy value. The survey conducted by 
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Brav et al. (2005) indicates that the three main factors that affect dividend decisions 
are: the ability to maintain stable dividends, future earnings and investors' 
preferences.  
 
 
However over the past few years companies a lot of dividend paying companies 
have not been able to maintain stable dividends. Kumba Iron Ore cut its dividends 
after full-year profits decreased by 29% (van Vuuren, 2015). The second largest 
shale gas and oil producer in the United States, Chesapeake Energy Corporation 
halted its quarterly dividend for the first time in 14 years as slumping energy prices 
crimped cash flow (Wilson, 2016). Similarly, there are speculations that Anglo 
America could cut its dividend for the first time since 2009 as tumbling commodity 
prices reduce the cash available to pay investors (Crowley & Riseborough, 2015). 
On the other hand, it is true that dividends decisions are affected by future earnings. 
Of the companies that have reduced their dividend pay-outs, the reduction in 
earnings income plays a major role in the decision to cut dividend pay-outs. This also 
pertains to the companies‘ future outlook. In fact the common trend among these 
companies is an initial decrease in earnings, as a result of economic conditions, 
followed by a dividend decrease. Investors become sceptical and start selling off 
their shares this causes the share price to fall even further.  
 
 
 Fama and French (2001) and Grullon and Michaely (2002) suggest that firm size 
contributes immensely to the size of the dividend. According to these theorists, large 
firms tend to pay more dividends to reduce agency costs since they face high 
agency costs as a result of ownership dispersion, increased complexity and the 
inability of shareholders to monitor firm activity closely. Due to the weak control in 
monitoring management in large firms, a large dividend pay-out increases the need 
for external financing, which in turn, leads to the increased monitoring of large firms 
by creditors. Another observation that can be made in relation to firm size is that, 
large firms are companies that have reached maturity. As a result they tend to have 
a lot of capital with very minimal investment opportunities that have positive NPVs. 
This leads to them paying large amounts of dividends. On the contrary, young firms 
with ample investment opportunities and limited funds do not pay dividends at all.  
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While theorists may have found conclusive evidence regarding the firm size effect, 
this has not been the case with the signalling theory of dividends. Firstly, there is a 
school of thought that does not find support for the assertion that dividend changes 
convey information about future earnings. Secondly studies on the market reaction to 
dividend announcements, yield results that are in accordance to the information 
signalling hypothesis. Thirdly, in most cases, analysts revise their predictions on 
earnings in the same direction with changes in dividends. Finally, empirical results 
obtained from field surveys are relatively mixed (Ma, 2012). Though academics may 
not be in one accord when it comes to the signalling theory of dividends, it should be 
noted that once a company initiates dividends, the variations in that amount do 
actually carry so sort of information content. The interesting question is what is the 
nature of that information? Benartzi et al. (1997) show that dividend policies reflect 
the past or current company performance before dividend announcement. According 
to Lintner (1956), dividend increases are a signal of management‘s belief that 
earnings have increased permanently, thus conveying information content about 
future earnings. Therefore, the objectives of this study are to determine: whether 
dividend changes reflect the future performance of firms and how the market reacts 
to transformations in dividend policy, from a South African perspective.  
 
 
Recent studies show that there is a decline in the propensity to pay dividends 
worldwide. In fact only large firms, with high profitability and low growth 
opportunities, have been known to have a greater propensity of paying dividends 
than small companies with high growth opportunities. A study conducted by Grullon 
and Michaely (2002) arrived to a conclusion that repurchases were gradually 
replacing dividends: companies funded their share repurchase programmes 
principally with funds that would have otherwise been used to make dividend 
payments. The report also showed that while companies were unwilling to reduce 
their dividends to initiate share repurchase programmes, new pay-outs were more 
likely to be exercised through repurchases than dividends.  
 
 
From a South African context, share buy-backs are a fairly new concept as 
companies were only allowed to repurchase their own shares on the 1st July 1999 
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(No. 37 of 1999). The first research on share repurchases in South Africa was done 
by Daly (2002). He investigated repurchase activities between July 1999 and 
September 2001. Further research on South African share repurchases was 
published by the likes of Bhana (2007), Bester (2008), Bester et al. (2010). 
Nonetheless, these researchers and many others have continued to complain about 
the extreme difficulty they have experienced when trying to obtain reliable data. 
South Africa‘s disclosure requirements are remarkably lax, when compared to other 
jurisdictions that allow share repurchases. The JSE‘s lax and poorly monitored 
requirements have led to repurchases sometimes getting announced years after they 
had been undertaken and in almost half of the open market repurchases, no 
announcements were made (Wesson, 2015). As a result of this, very few studies 
have been conducted on share repurchases in the South African market. This study 
seeks to contribute to the limited research that is available on share repurchases, 
within the South African market. The next chapter describes the methods employed 
to conduct the study.  
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CHAPTER 3 
3. METHODOLOGY (RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS) 
In this chapter, the methods and procedures which were used to accomplish the 
purpose of the research are presented.  
 
 
3.1 Sampling and Data Collection 
Using INET BFA, data for 226 dividend paying companies and 55 share 
repurchasing companies, trading on the JSE during the period 2003 to 2013, was 
collected. The sample selected, based on data availability, consisted of: cash 
dividend pay-outs and earnings per share for the years in which the dividend pay-out 
had either increased or decreased. These two variables were observed in order to 
determine whether cash dividend changes signal past or future changes in earnings. 
In addition to the aforementioned, event dates for share repurchases and daily share 
price returns for companies that had repurchased their shares were collected in 
order to ascertain what the market‘s reaction was, around the share repurchase 
event. The market‘s reaction was monitored by observing changes in share price 
returns, before and after the share repurchase event. A point to note is that none of 
the financial data sources in South Africa (McGregor BFA, I-Net Bridge and Reuters) 
have detailed records on share repurchases. Therefore it is impossible to obtain a 
complete picture of share repurchase activity that takes place.  
 
 
In selecting companies that formed part of the dividends sample, the following 
criteria had to be met: 
 Company distributions were semi-annual or annual cash dividend pay-outs 
nonetheless they had to be paid in South African rands. 
 The firm‘s earnings data must be available for the years in which the 
dividends were paid out.  
 The dividend pay-out did not represent a dividend initiation of a company. 
 Companies that had only issued cash dividends once, did not form part of the 
study. 
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The sample period chosen reflects a unique time in South Africa‘s economic 
development. During the period 2003-2007 there was relative political stability that 
fostered unprecedented corporate economic prosperity. Furthermore a fairly uniform 
dividend tax policy prevailed during this time, as dividends were not taxed in the 
hands of the individual (Wolff & Auret, 2009). However, from the year 2008 the world 
economy went into a recession. Some companies went under, while others stopped 
paying dividends altogether. Although other countries had recovered from this 
recession, South Africa‘s economy continued to experience sluggish growth. During 
the period 2008 to 2013, this economy was characterised by political instability, 
labour unrest, currency volatility, minimal growth and other pressing issues. Certain 
sectors that were among the best prior to the year 2008, experienced negative 
growth and continued to struggle during the aforementioned period.   
 
 
Furthermore, from the year 2012, the Secondary Tax on Companies declaring 
dividends was replaced with Dividend Tax levied at a rate of 15% on dividends paid 
by a company. The main difference between Dividend Tax and Secondary Tax on 
Companies lies in who is liable for the tax. Dividend Tax is a tax imposed on the 
shareholder upon receipt of the dividends, whereas Secondary Tax on Companies is 
a tax imposed on companies on the declaration of dividends (Strydom, 2012). A 
similar incident was experienced in the study conducted by Nell, Hamman and Smit 
(2001). During their sample period (1974 -1996), a change in the dividend tax regime 
transpired, where all investors, except for those falling into the lowest income 
bracket, incurred a dividend tax post March 1990. Previous studies show that, a 
tighter dividend tax regime during a portion of the sample period would depress the 
level of dividends paid by firms relative to the period when there was no Dividends 
Tax (Wolff & Auret, 2009). Sealy and Knight (1987) found a negative preference for 
dividends during the period (1973-1980), when the tax regime had changed. It will be 
interesting to see how the South African companies react to the introduction of 
Dividend tax.  
 
 
In the paper written by Benartzi et al. (1997) it was required that: for firms to be 
included in the sample, they had to have a financial year-end in December and 
   
73 
 
dividends be paid quarterly without fail for at least two consecutive years. In the 
South African context, dividends are paid annually or semi-annually. Including 
companies that only had a financial year-end falling in a specific month would lead to 
a data set that would be too small for meaningful analysis. Therefore, the 
requirement of Benartzi et al. (1997) that firms must issue dividends at a specific 
interval to be included, was relaxed. In addition to the aforementioned, firms were 
included in the sample irrespective of the year-end month. In the end, the entire 
population of firms meeting the above criteria was used for analysis. Such firms 
tended to be medium to large capitalisation firms with a strong earnings record. In 
the study conducted by Wolff and Auret (2009) an approach of a similar nature was 
adopted when selecting the data to be analysed. The study at hand also included all 
firms that had paid at least two consecutive dividends at any time during the sample 
years. Such an approach was adopted by Nell et al. (2001), so as to have a larger 
sample to analyse and to get a full picture on firms that issued dividends. 
 
 
In relation to share repurchases, several criteria had to be met, in the processing and 
preparation of the sample: 
 The daily share price returns data, for the 41 trading days surrounding the 
event, had to be available for each firm that has repurchased its shares, so as 
to monitor investors‘ perceptions of share buy-back event. 
 Company share buy backs had to be paid in South African rands. 
 Repeat events, where companies announced the same share repurchase 
program more than once, were excluded from the sample. This study only 
included the first and actual share repurchases. 
  Falsified events of share repurchases, where the company makes an event 
but ends up not repurchasing any shares, were also excluded from the 
sample. Therefore, the bid to repurchase shares had to be successful. 
 It was also required that the repurchase price be not predetermined in the 
following manner: A synthetic buyback in which companies buy a call or sell a 
put on their own shares. In these cases the repurchase takes place at the 
strike price, which is below the market price for calls and above the market 
price for put option transactions. 
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 Share repurchase prices, fixed years in advance, did not form part of the 
sample. 
 Specific and general share repurchases formed part of the sample. 
 
 
Event Window 
A window of 41 trading days from 20 days before to 20 days after the event day 0, or 
(-20, +20), is used to measure short-term share price return performance 
surrounding the actual repurchase events, for a period of 10 years. This window is 
approximately equivalent to one calendar month before and one calendar month 
after the event day. It was found to be particularly interesting to see how share prices 
change one month before and one month after the share repurchase event. As a 
company that had repurchased shares, it would be of great importance to see 
whether the benefits of repurchasing shares can be reaped within the first month of 
the event having taken place or would they occur in the long run. In determining an 
appropriate event window for this study a number studies were referenced. In the 
international paper written by Lamba and Ramsay (2000), a 41 day interval was 
observed in order to assess: whether there were any leakages of information prior to 
the share buy-backs being announced. Furthermore, the market model used by Isa, 
Ghani and Lee (2011) to obtain abnormal returns, uses an event window that starts 
from 20 days before the event and 20 days after the event (-20, +20) for 41 days. 
Lin, Lin and Liu (2011) also used the same market model and observed a 41 day 
window period, when examining share price behaviour around share repurchase 
events. The majority of the studies in the aforementioned focused on emerging 
economies, where share repurchases were a fairly new phenomenon. As a result a 
similar methodology was adopted in the study at hand since the South African 
economy is also perceived as an emerging economy. The market model was utilised 
to obtain abnormal returns and a 41 day window period was observed to monitor 
share price returns around the share repurchase event.  
 
 
In the paper written by Wesson et al. (2014) it was stated that the share repurchases 
data in their study was an improvement on the previous datasets used in South 
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African studies on the under reaction hypothesis of open market repurchases. As a 
result, the study at hand adopted the authors‘ approach of excluding repeat and 
falsified share repurchase events. These exclusions assisted in ensuring that data 
collected was accurate and represented the status quo of the South African 
repurchases market. In the study conducted by Bradley and Wakeman (1983), the 
final sample had to meet the following criteria: there had to be no problems in dating 
the event and the repurchase, the offer to repurchase shares had to be successful 
and daily rates of return on the ordinary share had to be available for the days 
surrounding the event. A similar method was assumed for the purposes of this study. 
The offer to repurchase shares had to be successful and no problems had to be 
encountered when sourcing the date for a specific share repurchase program. The 
date was particularly important because daily share returns (pre and post share 
repurchase events) had to be assessed. In a later study, performed by Peyer and 
Vermaelen (2004), it was required that the repurchase price not be predetermined in 
the following sense: synthetic buybacks in which companies buy a call or sell a put 
on their own shares. In these cases the repurchase takes place at the strike price, 
which is below the market price for calls and above the market price for put option 
transactions. Furthermore, the repurchase price had to not be based on an average 
of share prices over a certain number of days prior to the repurchase event and 
finally the repurchase price had to not be fixed two (three) years in advance. This 
method was also followed in the study at hand. Exclusions were made so as to 
construct a sample that represented share repurchases in their true nature. Previous 
studies have shown that share repurchases are a signal that shares are under-priced 
if companies fix the share repurchase price years in advance, then there is no signal 
being sent to the markets. Of course the market will under react because the 
repurchase price has been predetermined. Furthermore, synthetic share buybacks 
were excluded because the study at hand focused on actual share repurchase 
programs, where shares were repurchased by companies and there were no other 
factors that would influence the price of the share besides the fact that it was under-
priced, when compared to its normal trading price.  
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3.2  Description of Overall Research Design 
The three main variables in the study are firm earnings, dividend changes and the 
market‘s reaction (which will be measured using share prices returns before and 
after a share repurchase event). The first two variables (firm earnings and dividend 
changes) were used in the study conducted by Wolff and Auret (2009). Both 
variables were also used in an earlier study conducted by Nissim and Ziv (2001). 
The third variable (market reaction) was adopted from the study conducted by 
Wesson et al. (2014). The same variable was also used by Bhana (2007).  
 
 
The earnings measure chosen is headline earnings per share, defined as all the: 
profits and losses from operational, trading and interest activities, including those 
that have been discontinued or acquired at any point during the year. Omitted from 
this figure are: profits or losses associated with the sale or termination of 
discontinued operations, fixed assets or related businesses, or from any permanent 
devaluation or write-off of their values. In order to determine whether changes in 
dividends hold information content about changes in earnings, unexpected earnings 
for a firm year were defined as the difference between the actual earnings in that 
year and the earnings that were incurred in the previous year. This value was divided 
by the market value per share (for a particular firm) at the beginning of the base 
year. For the purposes of this study, the base year was the year 2003 and for the 
sake of convenience, ‗unexpected earnings change‘ were simply termed ‗earnings 
change‘ or ‗change in earnings‘ throughout this study. The market value per share 
deflator was utilised because market values incorporate information about future 
profitability from all possible sources (Nissim & Ziv, 2001).This method was also 
adopted by Wolff and Auret (2009).  
 
 
To determine whether dividend changes affect earnings, changes in the earnings of 
a firm were calculated as follows: 
 
  jt      j,t –   j,t-1     t,0              (1) 
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Earnings for firm (j) in year (t), less earnings for firm (j) in year (t-1), divided by the 
market value per share for firm (j) at the beginning of the base year (t), multiplied by 
100. 
 
 
For the purposes of this study, the term dividend referred to all ordinary dividends 
paid during the year. Special dividends (i.e. dividends paid by a company in lieu of a 
particular transaction, such as to distribute profits from the disposal of an asset to 
shareholders) were excluded. To determine the change in dividends, the difference 
between the dividend at time (t) and the dividend at time (t-1) was calculated and 
that answer was divided by the value of the dividend at time (t-1). The answer 
obtained was then be multiplied by 100, so as to convert it into percentage form. The 
formulas employed in the determination of changes in dividends, was obtained from 
the Wolff and Auret (2009) paper. 
   
  jt      j,t –  j,t – 1    j,t – 1                                                             (2) 
 
  
Similar to the study conducted by Wolff and Auret (2009), the regression model used 
to test whether dividend changes are beneficial in predicting earnings changes was 
recommended and used by Nissim and Ziv (2001). This model is written as follows: 
 
[  t   t-1]
  -1
   0    1   0   t       (3) 
 
 
According to the regression model: (Et) denotes earnings in year (t), (MV-1) 
represents the market value of the ordinary share  at the beginning of the dividend 
event year and (R∆D0) refers to the rate of change in dividend per share in year 0, 
defined identically as ‗change in dividend‘. Therefore, (β1∆Dj,t) is a change in 
dividends multiplied by the coefficient of a change in dividends. (β0) is the intercept 
and ( t) is the error term. The fundamental assumption of the regression is that 
earnings follow a random walk, so the change in earnings measures unexpected 
profitability (Nissim and Ziv, 2001).  
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Through the aid of correlation matrix, the study was able to determine the nature of 
the relationship between earnings and dividends. The correlation coefficient (ρ) was 
given by the covariance between changes in earnings and changes in dividends, 
divided by the standard deviation of changes in earnings (σe) and the standard 
deviation of changes in dividends (σd). While this method may have not been 
adopted from any study, it was included as an extension to the investigation on the 
relationship between changes in earnings and changes in dividends. In addition, the 
same method was used to monitor the correlation between share repurchases and 
earnings. The formula for the correlation coefficient is written as follows: 
 
  
     
     
          (4) 
 
 
The study at hand also addressed the question of whether changes in dividend 
policies caused changes in earnings. One way of doing this was through testing for 
causality, where F-tests were used to test whether lagged information on a variable 
(Y- dividend changes) provided any statistically significant information about a 
variable (X- earnings). A simple method of testing for causality uses autoregressive 
models. 
 
 t       t      t        (5) 
 
 
The current observation is given by (yt) and all the previous observations are given 
by (yt-1). (φ) symbolises the parameters to be estimated, which will be given by the 
Dickey-Fuller test, (μ) signifies the mean, while (εt) is the standard error. However, 
for the purposes of the study, the test for causality was conducted through the aid of 
Eviews. 
 
 
To estimate the share price responses to share repurchase events, Kapoor (2009) 
calculated a return (Rj,t) which is the time (t) return on security (j) as                                
(Pj,t – Pjt-1)/ (Pjt-1). (Pj,t) was the adjusted closing price of the share (j) on day (t). (Pjt-1) 
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was the adjusted closing price of share (j) on day (t-1). Nonetheless, for the 
purposes of this study, logarithmic returns were used. There are several benefits to 
using log returns, these include the fact that logs and exponents are easier to 
manipulate with calculus and as a result are mathematically convenient. Moreover, 
for short periods (e.g. daily) the log return approximates the discrete return anyway. 
Finally, log returns are time additive: a two period log return is identical to the sum of 
each period‘s log return.  The formula for log returns is written as follows: 
 
 j,t       j,t  j,t – 1          (6) 
    
 
The abnormal returns were then calculated for each of the days in the event window 
according to the equation shown below: 
 
          –                 (7) 
 
                             (8) 
 
 
Returns were estimated by employing equation (6). On the other hand, expected 
returns on the market were calculated using equation (8), where: (Rm,t) are the 
returns based on the broadly defined Johannesburg All Share Index, (εj,t) is the 
random error term, (αj) is the intercept, and (βj) is a regression constant. These 
equations were adopted from the study conducted by Kapoor (2006).  
 
 
Abnormal returns may be positive or negative as per the response of investors to the 
occurrence of event (the share repurchase event). Typically, some of the firms will 
show a negative abnormal return around the event when a positive figure was 
expected. If there are a certain number of firms or events (N), it is of interest to see 
whether the return averaged across all firms or whether this was the case for a 
specific individual firm. The average across all firms, for each separate day (t) during 
the event window, was calculated as follows: 
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                             (9) 
 
 
For the purposes of this study abnormal returns were averaged by dividing this value 
by the total number of events (N), to find out daily average abnormal returns.  
 
  
In order to ascertain the size of abnormal returns and average abnormal returns, 
over the entire event window, cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) and cumulative 
average abnormal returns (CAAR) were calculated as follows: 
 
                   (10) 
 
                       (11) 
 
 
CAR measures investors‘ total return over a period, starting from before the event of 
the share repurchase program to after the event day. A positive (CAR) indicates that 
the repurchase of shares adds to shareholders‘ value by conveying good news to the 
market. (CAAR) is the sum of average abnormal returns it may be positive or 
negative. If (CAAR) is negative in periods after the share repurchase event, this 
suggests that the events do not carry information about future earnings and cash 
flows of the companies.  
 
 
T-values of the estimated (ARs) and (CARs) are calculated using (Körner & 
Wahlgren, 2006):  
 
  
     
[
    
√ 
]
          (12) 
 
In the aforementioned formula: (AARt) is the average abnormal return at time (t), 
(σAR) is the cross-sectional standard deviation of the abnormal returns for the sample 
of (n) firms.  
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In conclusion, a point to note is that the methodology and formulae utilised for the 
section on share repurchases, was adopted from the paper written by Kapoor 
(2006), (Körner and Wahlgren, 2006) and (Axelsson and Brissman, 2011). This was 
mainly due to the fact that these studies were very similar to the study at hand. In 
relation to the section on dividends, the formulae applied were taken from the paper 
written by Wolffe and Auret (2009). The reason behind this was that both studies had 
similar objectives when addressing the issue of dividend pay-outs.  
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CHAPTER 4 
4.  RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
4.1.  Summary Statistics for Changes in Dividends and Changes in Earnings 
The summary statistics for changes in dividends and changes in earnings are 
presented in Table 1. According to the results obtained, the data set possesses non-
normal properties. The value of the means and the medians, across all the variables, 
differ from each other. Furthermore, the distribution for changes in dividends appears 
to be negatively skewed (-0.9695), while the distribution for changes in earnings 
appears to be positively skewed (0.8700). The kurtoses for changes in dividends is 
(3.2740) and (2.7339) for changes in earnings. The distribution for changes in 
dividends is leptokurtic since the kurtosis is larger than the number (3). This further 
indicates that the data is not normally distributed. On the other hand, the distribution 
for changes in earnings seems to be platykurtic since the kurtosis is smaller than the 
number (3). Platykurtosis is associated with distributions that are simultaneously less 
peaked and have thinner tails. This too suggests that the data is not normally 
distributed. This implies that non-parametric tests would have to be used. 
 
  
Table 1: Basic Statistical Measures 
Descriptive Statistics Changes in Dividends Changes in Earnings 
Mean 2.8143 0.6012 
Median 5.1189 0.1654 
Standard Deviation 7.9047 1.1417 
Sample Variance 62.4844 1.3036 
Kurtosis 3.2740 2.7339 
Skewness -0.9695 0.8700 
Minimum -14.9642 -0.7584 
Maximum 11.5713 2.9254 
Jarque-Bera 1.7576 1.4202 
Probability 0.4152 0.4916 
source: I-Net BFA and Author’s own estimates  
 
 
Figure 1, depicts the change in dividends and the linear forecast trend line. 
According to this graph there is a negative trend in the change in dividends. This 
indicates that companies are reducing dividends instead of increasing them. It could 
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also indicate that there are fewer new listing companies that are issuing dividends. 
The linear forecast trend line predicts further declines in dividend changes, post the 
sample period. The results of the paper written by Fama and French (2001) show 
that even after controlling for firm characteristics, firms then had a lower propensity 
to pay dividends. Furthermore, Grullon and Michaely (2002) highlight the fact that 
dividend payments had grown at an average rate of 7.5 percent per year, while 
share repurchase volume had grown at an average rate of 28.3 percent. The 
question that comes to mind is: what are the reasons for the change in corporate pay 
out policy. Some of the main drivers behind the declines in the propensity to pay-out 
dividends include the high taxes imposed on dividend pay-outs. According to the 
theory on tax clientele, different tax rates are applied on dividends and share 
repurchases. This causes an average shareholder to favour companies that do not 
pay large dividends because taxes on dividends are generally higher than on capital 
gains.  Therefore, companies may reduce their propensity to pay dividends in order 
to satisfy the needs of their clientele (Dhanani & Roberts, 2009).  
 
 
Figure 1: Changes in Dividends and the Linear Forecast Trend Line 
 
source: I-Net BFA and Author’s own estimates  
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The forecast that dividends will continue to decline could not be rejected, as depicted 
in Figure 1. Large companies such as: Kumba, Glencore, Sasol and Anglo American 
all cut their dividends in the year 2015. The rationale behind these dividend 
reductions seems to be poor company performance, which was caused by the 
sluggish growth of the South African economy (Janse van Vuuren, 2015; McDonald 
and Patterson, 2015; Stoddard, 2015; Yeomans, 2015). An additional explanation for 
the decline in the forecasted trend line may be that the pace at which companies are 
willing to buy back their own shares has increased dramatically Wesson (2015). 
Companies such as Anglo America and Sasol are labelled as the big spenders when 
it comes to share repurchase programs in South Africa. South African shareholders 
have approved of this growing trend, without any questions. This could be partly 
explained by the belief that share buy backs generally increase the share price, 
which benefits the remaining shareholders Wesson (2015). 
 
 
4.2. Earnings Changes following Dividend Changes 
Table 2 presents changes in earnings in the year of and the years following the 
dividend changes. Three firm-years in the sample were slotted into one of the 
dividend increasing quintiles (quintile one represents the group with the lowest 
dividends increases and quintile five represents the group with the highest increase 
in dividends), no change in dividends group, or the dividend reduction group. 
Dividend changes are defined as the difference between the annual dividend at (T0) 
and the annual dividend at (T-1), divided by the annual dividend in at (T-1). Raw 
earnings change is defined as the difference between the annual change in earnings 
per share in at (T0) and earnings per share in (T-1), divided by market value at the 
beginning of (T-1).  
 
 
When examining Table 2, it was considered that if dividends have information 
content about earnings, two hypotheses should hold. Firstly, an increase (decrease) 
in dividend change at (T0) is followed by an increase (decrease) in earnings change 
at (T1) and (T2) and onwards. Secondly the greater the increase in dividend change, 
the greater the increase in earnings changes in the following years. The 
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methodology shown in the aforementioned was adopted from the studies conducted 
by authors Benartzi et al. (1997) and Wolffe and Auret (2009). 
 
 
Table 2: Earnings changes following dividend changes 
Dividend Change Mean Dividend 
Change 
T 0  T 1  T 2  
   Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Raw Earnings Changes (n = 226) 
Decreases -1.036 * -0.022 -0.007 0.041 0 -0.002 0 
No Change 0 -0.002 0 0.020 0 0.015 0 
Increases: Quintile 1 0.126 * 0.006 0 -0.007 0 -0.009 0 
Increases: Quintile  2 0.287 * 0.084 0.083 0.028 0.029 0.022 0.020 
Increases: Quintile  3 0.489 * 0.160 0.162 0.063 0.061 * 0.067 0.060 
Increases: Quintile  4 0.680 * 0.219 0.212 0.120 0.122 * 0.119 0.109 
Increases: Quintile  5 0.994 * 0.279 0.281 * 0.298 0.206 * 0.292 0.282 
source: I-Net BFA and Author’s own estimates 
* represents the means that are significantly different from the no-change group at the  5% significance levels 
respectively using a two-tailed Student’s t-test  
 
 
According to results obtained, the firms that elected not to change dividends at (T0) 
experienced negative earnings with a mean change of (-0,002 or -0.2%). In contrast, 
firms that increase their dividends at (T0) perform well in that year, excluding the 
firms in quintile one. Furthermore, all the dividend-increasing firms have significantly 
larger increases in earnings than the no-change group, with the firms in the largest 
increase group experiencing a mean earnings rise of (0.279 or 27, 9%). The results 
of Table 2 also indicate that firms which cut dividends suffer a mean earnings decline 
of (-0,022 or -2.2%) at (T0). This value is significantly different from the no-change 
group at the 5% level. Therefore it is strikingly clear that the relationship between 
dividend changes and concurrent earnings changes is positive and strong. Similar 
results were obtained in the study conducted by Benartzi et al. (1997) and Wolffe 
and Auret (2009). 
 
 
The scene changes slightly at (T1). According to results obtained, firms that elected 
not to change dividends at (T1) experience positive earnings with a mean change of 
(0,020 or 2%). All the firms that had increased their dividends (excluding those in the 
first quintile) continue to experience positive earnings, with firms in the largest 
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increase group (quintile five) displaying the largest earnings with a mean that is 
significantly different from the no-change group at a 5% level. None of the other 
dividend increasing groups reflect earnings with means that are significantly different 
from the no-change group at a 5% level. Although significance is lacking, it should be 
pointed out that the second implication of the dividend-signalling hypothesis is 
satisfied at (T1), namely that firms with the largest dividend increases (quintile five) 
experience higher earnings growth than the firms in the lower dividend increasing 
group (quintile one). Interestingly, the decrease group shows positive earnings 
growth (though insignificant) which exceeds that of the increase groups in quintile 
one and two. In sum, there are some contradictions to the signalling theory, at (T1). 
Firms that decrease dividends experience positive earnings, furthermore certain 
firms that increase their dividends show declines in their earnings. Similar results 
were obtained in the study conducted by Benartzi et al. (1997).  
 
 
At (T2) the no-change group, which achieved earnings growth of (0.015 or 1.5%), 
reflected higher positive earnings growth than the increase group in quintile one and 
the decrease group. All increase group earnings (excluding the group in quintile one) 
are positive at (T2), with three of the five dividend increase groups reflecting 
earnings with means that are significantly different from the no-change group at a 
5% level. Table 2 further indicated that firms which cut dividends suffer a mean 
earnings decline of (-0,002 or -0.2%) at (T2). In the paper written by Benartzi et al. 
(1997), one of the dividend increase groups also experienced negative earnings 
growth. It was then held that while there is a strong past and concurrent link between 
earnings and dividend changes, the predictive value of changes in dividends seems 
minimal. Therefore there is a strong inference that managers of consistent dividend-
paying companies on the JSE do not use dividends to signal future earnings. 
 
  
According to the agency theory, managers that are left with some free cash flow can 
easily waste company funds on perquisites or bad projects because as a part owner, 
they do not bear all the costs the firm incurs. By paying out dividends managers‘ 
powers over the cash flow of a firm are limited. The agency theory may be used to 
explain the presence of the dividend increase groups in Table 2.  Nonetheless, 
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previous research has shown that mixed empirical evidence exists as to whether 
dividends are actually successful at reducing agency costs among the firm‘s 
stakeholders (Easterbrook, 1984; Crutchley and Hansen, 1989; Chaplinsky and 
Niehaus, 1993). This is not unexpected given that agency costs are not directly 
observable and difficult to relate with a firm‘s dividend policy. Another theory that 
may explain the issuance of dividends is the catering theory, which states that 
managers give investors what they currently want. According to Gordon (1963), 
shareholders prefer cash dividends as they are more certain than capital gains. 
When a particular firm makes high dividend pay-outs, that firm is able to maximize its 
firm value and get a higher rating from rating agencies. Table 2 shows that, from the 
dividend increasing firms, positive earnings are experienced for all the groups except 
the group found in quintile one. Nonetheless, the highest dividend increasing group 
experiences the highest growth in earnings. An interesting point however, is that 
firms in the no-change and dividend cut groups also experience positive earnings 
at(T1) and (T2). This re-iterates that notion that the dividend puzzle remains a 
mystery. In conclusion, it can be said that there is a strong concurrent relationship 
between dividend changes and earnings changes in South Africa. This makes 
sense, given that earnings and dividend events are made on the same day in South 
Africa. The results do not provide evidence that dividends convey information 
content with respect to earnings at (T1) or (T2). 
 
 
4.3. Test for Causality and Correlation 
Bhattacharya (1979), Miller and Rock (1985) and John and Williams (1985) provide 
empirical evidence which suggests that dividend policy changes, signal a firm‘s 
future expectations. If a particular firm experiences a dividend cut, that firm will later 
experience a decline in average earnings per share (Howatt et al., 2009). To test this 
proposition, the Granger test for causality and the correlation matrix were adopted. 
The results displayed in Table 3 indicate that the null hypotheses cannot be rejected 
at a 5% level of significance, a change in earnings does not granger cause changes 
in dividends (0.1153 > 0.05). In addition, a change in dividends does not granger 
cause changes in earnings (0.5484 > 0.05). These results were not surprising as 
numerous researchers have developed strong arguments against the idea of 
changes in dividends causing changes in earnings. Miller and Modigliani (1961) were 
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among the first to support the notion that dividends had no effect on shareholder 
wealth. Watts (1973), then established that unexpected dividend changes, contained 
little information on the future earnings of a firm. At a later stage, Wolff and Auret 
(2009) found absolutely no support for dividend changes being capable to predict 
future changes in earnings. The results obtained in this section highlight the fact that 
there is an on-going debate around the idea of changes in dividends causing 
changes in earnings researchers cannot seem to find a common ground, when it 
comes to this matter. 
 
 
Table 3: Granger Causality Tests 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Lags: 2 
  
Null Hypothesis: F-Statistic P-values 
Changes in Earnings does not Granger Cause  Changes in Dividends 2.6463 0.1153 
Changes in Dividends does not Granger Cause Changes in Earnings 0.6349 0.5484 
source: I-Net BFA and Author’s own estimates 
 
 
Table 4 presents the correlation matrix of changes in dividends and changes in 
earnings. According to the findings, there is a positive correlation (0.4236) between 
changes in dividends and changes in earnings. This relationship may be caused by 
the fact that dividend and earnings events are made on the same day in South 
Africa, therefore when current dividends are high, current earnings are likely to be 
high as well. 
 
 
Table 4: Correlation Matrix 
 
Change Dividends Change Earnings 
Change in Dividends 1 0.4236 
Change in Earnings 0.4236 1 
source: I-Net BFA and Author’s own estimates 
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4.4. Summary Statistics for Share Price Returns- Share Repurchases Data 
The summary statistics for share returns (20 days before and 20 days after the share 
repurchase events) are presented in Table 5. According to the results obtained, the 
data set possesses non-normal properties. The value of the means and the medians, 
across all the variables, differ from each other. Furthermore, the distribution of the 
data (-0.1376) is negatively skewed and the kurtoses (6.3992) is higher than the 
value of (3), which is required for data to be normally distributed. Therefore, the 
distribution for share price returns is leptokurtic. A leptokurtic distribution is similar to 
a normal distribution but has a sharper peak around the mean and fatter tails. This is 
evident in Figure 2, which clearly shows that the daily returns do not follow a normal 
distribution. Leptokurtosis is an indication of volatility clustering. The Jarque-Bera 
test statistic examines the skewness and kurtosis, where H0: S=0 and K=0 and H1: S
≠0 and K≠0. The probability is less than (5%), therefore the null hypothesis is 
rejected and it is concluded that the series is not normally distributed. This is not 
surprising as the histogram did indicate this. 
 
 
Table 5: Basic Statistical Measures 
Descriptive Statistics Share Price Returns 
Mean 0.0003 
Median 0.0002 
Standard Deviation 0.0064 
Kurtosis 6.3992 
Skewness -0.1376 
Minimum -0.0191 
Maximum 0.0214 
Probability 0.0000 
Jarque-Bera 19.8684 
source: I-Net BFA and Author’s own estimates 
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Series: SHARE_PRICE_RETURNS
Sample 1 41
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Mean       0.000302
Median   0.000182
Maximum  0.021373
Minimum -0.019093
Std. Dev.   0.006464
Skewness  -0.137613
Kurtosis   6.399197
Jarque-Bera  19.86842
Probability  0.000048
Figure 2: Histogram for Share Price Returns 
source: I-Net BFA and Author’s own estimates 
 
 
It is indicated in Figure 3 that the mean for the sample is not constant. , Greater 
volatility can be seen 6 days before the share repurchase event and 9 days after. In 
particular, share price returns decline to (-0.0163) at (T-5) then increase to (0.0214) 
from (T0) to (T3). The returns decline again, to (-0.0192) from (T4) to (T9). According 
to this data set, it seems as though companies repurchasing their shares were 
signalling undervaluation to the market as share price returns are negative up until 
the repurchase event. Lee et al. (2010) show that management will repurchase 
shares for reasons such as: signalling to the market that the shares are undervalued, 
distributing cash to shareholders, warding off potential takeover raiders, distributing 
excess cash when there are no profitable investment opportunities, adjusting 
financial leverage and avoiding dilution. However, signalling stands as the biggest 
motivator for repurchasing shares. Research shows that investors generally perceive 
share repurchase programmes as having a positive impact on the share price, hence 
the share return increases experienced during the time of the event (Dhanani & 
Roberts, 2009).   
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Figure 3: Daily Share Price Returns   
source: I-Net BFA and Author’s own estimates 
 
  
4.5. Abnormal Share Returns  
Figure 4 demonstrates abnormal share returns. From this graph, one can ascertain 
that there are numerous moments where abnormal returns (which are the firm‘s 
returns after subtracting out returns attributable to overall movements of the share 
market) are negative, even though share price returns are positive. In fact, the 
findings show that pre-event abnormal returns are negative and significant at a 95-
percent level since the p-value (0.00001) is smaller than (0.05). Yook (2010) lends 
support to this finding as he shows significant negative pre-event returns in the 6 
months preceding the share repurchase event. A possible explanation could be that 
share repurchase programs seem to be a signal of share undervaluation. Therefore, 
managers use share repurchases as an instrument for stabilising a company‘s share 
price, which is undervalued at the time and has been following a downward trend for 
many consecutive days. Figure 4 and Table 6 show positive abnormal returns at T4 
(1.454%) and T7 (0.235%), nonetheless, the p-values for T4 (0.0769) and T7 
(0.4077) are not significant at a 95-percent level. According to Bukalska (2014), 
results of this nature indicate the presence of the ‗event effect‘: which is the impact 
that certain information on changes that will occur at some future date, can have on 
financial markets. Further support for this notion was displayed in the paper written 
by Schweitzer (1989). The findings of that study show that news of a significant 
event has the potential of altering the patterns of share returns of a firm or industry.  
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Figure 4: Abnormal Share Returns 
 
source: I-Net BFA and Author’s own estimates 
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Table 6: Abnormal Returns, Cumulative Abnormal Returns and T-Statistics for Event 
Window T-20 to T20 
 
 
 
 
 
Time Abnormal  Returns Cumulative Abnormal Returns Standard Deviation T-statistic N 
-20 -0.684% -0.684% 0% - 41 
-19 -0.195% -0.879% 0.054% -0.397 41 
-18 -0.202% -1.081% 0.044% -0.603 41 
-17 -0.394% -1.475% 0.018% -2.037 41 
-16 -1.153% -2.627% 0.078% -0.816 41 
-15 -0.387% -3.014% 0.069% -1.070 41 
-14 -0.727% -3.741% 0.060% -1.523 41 
-13 -0.832% -4.572% 0.036% -3.073 41 
-12 -0.603% -5.175% 0.018% -7.050 41 
-11 -0.438% -5.613% 0.031% -4.434 41 
-10 0.187% -5.426% 0.065% -2.033 41 
-9 -0.667% -6.093% 0.069% -2.151 41 
-8 -0.281% -6.374% 0.067% -2.326 41 
-7 -1.002% -7.376% 0.056% -3.191 41 
-6 -0.886% -8.261% 0.060% -3.331 41 
-5 -0.579% -8.841% 0.034% -6.325 41 
-4 -2.315% -11.155% 0.145% -1.881 41 
-3 -0.665% -11.821% 0.153% -1.887 41 
-2 -0.073% -11.894% 0.181% -1.599 41 
-1 -0.870% -12.764% 0.065% -4.820 41 
0 -0.522% -13.285% 0.062% -5.198 41 
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Table 6: Abnormal Returns, Cumulative Abnormal Returns and T-Statistics for Event 
Window T-20 to T20 (continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
source: I-Net BFA and Author’s own estimates 
*  represents postive abnormal returns on the table 
 
 
Assuming that an event is taken as good news, that is, investors believe the event 
signifies a bright future for the company the firm‘s share price will increase. This 
price increase represents a capital gain, which raises the return on the firm‘s share, 
post the share repurchase event. Moreover, the findings show strong support for the 
Time Abnormal  Returns Cumulative Abnormal Returns Standard Deviation T-statistic N 
1 -1.074% -14.359% 0.044% -8.035 41 
2 -1.381% -15.740% 0.068% -5.643 41 
3 -0.933% -16.673% 0.036% -11.354 41 
*4 1.454% -15.219% 0.238% -1.560 41 
5 -1.160% -16.380% 0.226% -1.767 41 
6 -0.416% -16.796% 0.210% -1.948 41 
*7 0.235% -16.560% 0.109% -3.704 41 
8 -1.129% -17.689% 0.107% -4.049 41 
9 -2.593% -20.282% 0.221% -2.239 41 
10 -0.165% -20.446% 0.191% -2.612 41 
11 -0.402% -20.849% 0.209% -2.432 41 
12 -1.173% -22.022% 0.082% -6.525 41 
13 -0.885% -22.907% 0.061% -9.190 41 
14 -0.855% -23.762% 0.027% -21.152 41 
15 -0.274% -24.036% 0.054% -10.904 41 
16 -0.194% -24.231% 0.056% -10.490 41 
17 -0.941% -25.172% 0.064% -9.587 41 
18 -0.592% -25.764% 0.058% -10.768 41 
19 -0.807% -26.572% 0.027% -23.579 41 
20 -0.214% -26.786% 0.047% -13.931 41 
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existence of abnormal returns. Bhana (2007) confirmed the presence of these 
abnormal returns in the South African market and maintained that share repurchase 
events had a similar effect to that experienced in the United States. In the study at 
hand, initial abnormal returns (following a share repurchase event) increase to (4, 
38%) between the period (T-2) and (T+2). 
 
 
With the knowledge that the event day will yield positive abnormal returns, it is highly 
likely for insider traders to take positive positions in the share, before the event. This 
action would result in positive abnormal returns on the days before the event. The 
results of this study show negative abnormal returns for the days before the event. 
Therefore there seems to be no evidence of insider trading before the share 
repurchase event. An interesting observation made from Figure 4, is that the trend 
line illustrates a declining tendency of abnormal share returns. The question as to 
why this trend extends over the entire period is intriguing and requires further work 
and research be done. Some answers to this conundrum are provided by Shleifer 
and Vishny (1990) who discuss how market inefficiencies can occur during long 
horizons. According to these authors, managers of firms are typically averse to 
severe pricing of their equity because they risk getting fired or getting taken over. A 
short-term asset is one where mispricing must disappear in the near future, whereas 
mispricing of a long-term asset can persist over a long period. Examples of short-
term assets are options, futures and other instruments that have a fixed and 
relatively short expiration time. Examples of long-term assets are shares and foreign 
exchange, where mispricing can take a long time to correct. Nevertheless, shares 
can sometimes be a short-term asset. For example an arbitrageur betting on the 
outcome of a takeover bid, or an event of an imminent earnings, or other public 
event can expect the mispricing that he is betting against, to disappear quite fast. 
Such an arbitrageur can liquidate his position even if he believes that the share is 
still under-priced and does not have to wait until that mispricing is corrected.  
 
 
In relation to the study at hand, there is evidence of a slight correction in the 
undervaluation of the share prices, in the short run. This price adjustment is as a 
result of the share repurchase event. Nonetheless, the correction is short lived, as 
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reflected by the trend line. A possible explanation for the long-drawn-out period of 
mispricing is that a share is also perceived as a long term asset therefore mispricing 
can persist for extended periods. Unfortunately, the sample period is not long 
enough to reflect when the share mispricing will disappear.  
 
 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns measure investors‘ total return over a period, starting 
from before the event of the share repurchase program to after the event day. In the 
period leading up to the share repurchase event (see Table 6), the short horizon 
event study shows negative cumulative abnormal returns of (-12.764%). These 
results provide supporting evidence relating to the argument that managers time the 
event of share buybacks, and only repurchase shares in periods of undervaluation. 
On the other hand, it should be noted that firms also repurchase shares in times of 
falling markets. The sample period covered in the study at hand, also includes the 
period pertaining to the financial crisis (2007 to 2009). During this time the global 
economy went into a recession. This resulted in numerous shares losing market 
value. In an attempt to stabilise share prices, managers repurchased shares. 
However, from a South African perspective it should be noted that the economy 
entered a recession in late 2008 and early 2009, when the South African GDP 
declined for three consecutive quarters (Statistics South Africa, 2015). 
 
 
The results of the study at hand show that post the share repurchase event day (T0), 
a run-up in share prices can be observed. This increase is depicted by the positive 
abnormal returns which are witnessed post the event day. These findings imply that 
investors in South Africa interpret share repurchase events as good signals sent by 
management, and react positively to these events. However, under the assumption 
of efficient markets, the market‘s investors should discount the new information that 
the event gives and the share price should adjust immediately. The subsequent new 
share price equilibrium should thereby fully reflect the new information. According to 
the results of the study at hand, positive abnormal returns are witnessed three to four 
days after the event. A possible explanation proposed by Ikenberry et al. (1995) 
suggests that the market underreacts to share repurchase events. In fact, these 
authors highlight that there may be instances where significant positive abnormal 
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returns are only observed days or even years after an event of a share repurchase 
program. When observing cumulated abnormal returns, the results of this study 
show that, while there may be an increase in abnormal returns, post the event day, 
the summation of these positive values is not high enough to change the direction of 
the trend. Yook (2010) raises an interesting point. He states that the risk of the 
announced share repurchase program not being completed is a contributing factor 
when it comes to investors not reacting in a manner that is expected by managers. 
Investors know that the share repurchase announcement is not a commitment from 
the company to repurchase shares. The company may choose to buy back only a 
part of the shares announced or even cancel the entire repurchase program. 
Therefore, investors may under react to share repurchase announcements and 
events, when compared to dividend pay-out announcements and events.  
 
 
The results obtained by Axelsson and Brissman (2011) indicate that the cumulated 
abnormal returns for the period before the event, are (-4, 17%) and (2, 84%) ten 
days after the event. Nonetheless, the positive returns post the share repurchase 
event, are not significant on conventional levels. These findings are different to those 
obtained in the study at hand, when it comes to post event cumulative abnormal 
returns. A possible explanation for the differences may be the fact that the study 
conducted by Axelsson and Brissman (2011) only focuses on listed real estate 
companies. The results reported in the study at hand demonstrate that, announcing 
a share repurchase program generates a positive abnormal return to shareholders. 
However, when summing up the negative values with the positive values, the final 
outcome becomes negative accumulated abnormal returns. The positive values are 
not high enough to change the direction of the returns. 
 
 
The cumulative abnormal returns methodology does not allow clear assessment of 
how returns change post the share repurchase. Nonetheless, it should be noted that 
the investors‘ reaction to news on a share repurchase event, is not always 
completed over short time periods. This is an assumption made in many event 
studies. The current trend may be subject to change, whereby the full impact of 
corporate events extends over several years. 
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4.6. Average Abnormal Returns 
Abnormal returns have a tendency of being positive or negative as per the response 
of investors to share repurchase events. In certain instances, firms may show a 
negative abnormal return around the event when a positive figure is expected. 
Therefore, it is of interest to see whether the return averaged across all firms or 
whether this was the case for a specific individual firm. According to Figure 5, 
average abnormal returns are fairly negative prior to the share repurchase event. 
The average abnormal returns for the period (T-20) to (T-1) are (-0.0001). These 
results reiterate the notion that share repurchase events are a signal of 
undervaluation and support the findings obtained in the section on abnormal share 
returns. On average, managers will repurchase shares if the firm‘s share price has 
been experiencing consistent declines for a particular period of time.  
 
 
Figure 5: Average Abnormal Returns                   
 
source: I-Net BFA and Author’s own estimates 
 
 
In Figure 5, it is further indicated that returns only increase three days after the share 
repurchase event. According to the findings of the paper written by Chan et al. 
(2007), if investors cannot, ex-ante, sort through this potentially misleading 
behaviour, an under reaction (in terms of returns) will be experienced following a 
share repurchase event. The market does however correct this under reaction over 
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time as additional information arrives, resulting in positive information shocks. 
Another explanation could be that, prior to the share repurchase event share prices 
had been falling anyway. The event causes an uptick in the share prices, thus 
leading to a gradual increase in share returns. Once the hype around the share 
buyback event stops, share prices return to their falling state. The results of the 
study at hand show that average abnormal share returns eventually go back to 
negative territory, post the share repurchase event. The average event returns are 
consistent with the interpretation that share buybacks are generally viewed in a 
positive light. Punwasi (2012) observed positive initial abnormal return of (0.51%) in 
the two days following the event. Vermaelen (1981) examined the price behaviour of 
shares repurchased by companies. From (T-2) to (T0), the two-day average 
abnormal share return was (3, 37%). In the study conducted by Axelsson and 
Brissman (2011) it was found that positive average returns had a value of (1,96%) on 
the event day. Furthermore the average abnormal returns, for the 10 days following 
the event, were (0, 26%) per day. Nevertheless, not all the studies illustrated 
conclusive results. Nittayagasetwat and Nittayagasetwat (2013) found that after 
three days of the share repurchase event, the average abnormal returns were mixed 
between positive and negative values. The results of Daly's (2002) study were also 
inconclusive owing to the short period under consideration. 
 
 
4.7.  Cumulative Average Abnormal Return 
Cumulative average abnormal returns are the sum of average abnormal returns. If 
the equities market does not anticipate an event, the cumulative average abnormal 
returns up to the event date, should be approximately zero. If the event is 
anticipated, the returns would move up several days before the event. According to 
the findings of the study at hand, the cumulative average abnormal returns are 
negative before the event date (as shown in Table 7). A value of (-2.899%) can be 
observed at (T-1).  This negative value is not surprising as it was established in the 
previous sections that share repurchase events are either a response to a trend of 
falling share prices, or a signal of undervaluation. What is of particular interest is the 
continuation of negative cumulative average abnormal returns post the share 
repurchase event. At (T+20), a cumulative average return value of (-13.278%) is 
observed. While this result may be an indication of the market‘s under reaction to 
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share repurchase events, it is particularly strange when compared to other studies of 
a similar nature.  
 
 
Table 7: Average Abnormal Returns and Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns for 
Event Window T-20 to T+20   
Time Average Abnormal Returns Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns 
-20 -0.017% -0.017% 
-19 -0.021% -0.038% 
-18 -0.026% -0.064% 
-17 -0.036% -0.100% 
-16 -0.064% -0.164% 
-15 -0.074% -0.238% 
-14 -0.091% -0.329% 
-13 -0.112% -0.441% 
-12 -0.126% -0.567% 
-11 -0.137% -0.704% 
-10 -0.132% -0.836% 
-9 -0.149% -0.985% 
-8 -0.155% -1.140% 
-7 -0.180% -1.320% 
-6 -0.201% -1.522% 
-5 -0.216% -1.737% 
-4 -0.272% -2.009% 
-3 -0.288% -2.298% 
-2 -0.290% -2.588% 
-1 -0.311% -2.899%  
0 -0.324% -3.223% 
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Table 7: Average Abnormal Returns and Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns for 
Event Window T-20 to T+20 (continued) 
source: I-Net BFA and Author’s own estimates 
 
 
According to the study conducted by Manconi, Peyer and Vermaelen (2014), results 
showed that the total average cumulative abnormal returns were (2.05%) in English 
common law countries, (1.40%) in Germany, (1.08%) in Scandinavian countries and 
(0.37%) in French civil law countries. Over the entire event window, no significantly 
negative cumulative average abnormal returns were recorded. In a South African 
Time Average Abnormal Returns Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns 
1 -0.350% -3.573% 
2 -0.384% -3.957% 
3 -0.407% -4.364% 
4 -0.371% -4.735% 
5 -0.400% -5.135% 
6 -0.410% -5.544% 
7 -0.404% -5.948% 
8 -0.431% -6.380% 
9 -0.495% -6.874% 
10 -0.499% -7.373% 
11 -0.509% -7.882% 
12 -0.537% -8.419% 
13 -0.559% -8.977% 
14 -0.580% -9.557% 
15 -0.586% -10.143% 
16 -0.591% -10.734% 
17 -0.614% -11.348% 
18 -0.628% -11.977% 
19 -0.648% -12.625% 
20 -0.653% -13.278% 
   
102 
 
study conducted by Wesson et al. (2014)  prior to the event date, the cumulative 
average abnormal returns remained marginally below zero at about (-1 %).  In the 
days surrounding the share repurchase event, (T-3) to (T+3), a small increase of 
about (1%) was observed. In the period following the event, from (T+10) to (T+22), 
the cumulative average abnormal returns declined a further (2%). The findings 
obtained in the conducted by Wesson et al. (2014) are similar to those displayed in 
Table 7. Following the share repurchase event, slight increases to the value of 
(0.035%) at (T+4) and (0.006%) at (T+7) can be observed, nonetheless these 
increases are not large enough to change the declining trend of the returns. Post 
(T+7), the results show that returns revert back to negative territory. The main 
difference between the results obtained in the study at hand and the results obtained 
by Wesson et al. (2014) is that, the values by which the returns increase and 
decrease by are much lower in the study at hand. Furthermore, the sample period 
covered is slightly shorter, therefore one cannot see the full effect of the share 
repurchase event. As discussed in the previous section, a share is also perceived as 
a long term asset therefore mispricing can persist for extended periods and later 
correct itself. In the study carried out by Wesson et al. (2014), a longer event window 
was observed to obtain a better idea of the long-term effects. Looking at the period 
(T-60) to (T+720), that is approximately three months prior to the event, the following 
long-term effects were observed: from (T+50) the cumulative average abnormal 
returns steadily increase to about (35%) at (T+600), then the trend dissipates for the 
equal-weighted sample. In the weighted sample the cumulative abnormal average 
returns follow a similar pattern where there is an increase of (48%) at about (T+550) 
thereafter the trend is almost flat. From the information in the aforementioned, it can 
be concluded that, on average, the market underreacts to share repurchase events, 
nevertheless the full impact of the share repurchase events can extend over several 
years. 
 
 
4.8. The Relationship between Share Repurchases and Changes in Earnings  
A linear regression model was employed in testing whether share repurchases are 
useful in predicting changes in earnings.  According to the results reported in Table 
11, the R2 (0.5001) and adjusted R2 (0.4376) measures are fairly low. This implies 
that there might be a lack of linearity between share repurchases and changes in 
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earnings. Nonetheless, the coefficient for share repurchases (0.07214) is positive 
and significant in predicting changes in earnings as it has a p-value less than 5% 
(0.0222 < 0.05).  The intercept is also significant (0.0231 < 0.05). These results (as 
shown in Table 8), indicate that from the regression model, share repurchases are a 
good predictor of future changes in earnings.  
 
 
Table 8: Summary Statistics from Regression of Change in Earnings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
source: I-Net BFA and Author’s own estimates 
 
 
The traditional signalling hypothesis relating to share repurchases, is motivated by 
asymmetric information between the managers of a firm and the market (Vermaelen 
& Dann, 1981). If the managers of the firm have superior information about the future 
prospect of the firm, and know that the firm is undervalued, they can initiate a 
repurchase plan to convey this information. Due to the new information about future 
earnings, implied by the event, a positive price impact on the event day is expected, 
as prices adjust to the new information. The results of the study conducted by Hirtle 
(2003) indicate that higher repurchases by a bank holding company are associated 
with enhanced earnings and better asset quality in the year following the 
repurchases, especially for publicly-traded firms. There are two potential 
explanations for this relationship: first, that bank holding company managers have 
private information about the bank‘s future prospects that leads them to return profits 
to shareholders in the form of repurchases, possibly as a way of signalling to market 
about improved future performance. In this scenario, repurchases are essentially a 
Dependent Variable: Changes in Earnings 
Method: Linear Regression Model 
Root MSE 1.25338 R-Square 0.5001 
Dependent Mean 0.99506 Adjusted R-Square 0.4376 
Coeff Var 125.96 
  
Variable 
Parameter 
T-Value Pr > |t| 
Estimate 
Intercept -102.03 -2.8 0.0231 
Share Repurchases 0.07214 2.83 0.0222 
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proxy for this private information. In the second explanation, managers choose to 
make repurchases when cash flow is abundant relative to outside investment 
opportunities. An alternative argument states that for firms which only make 
repurchases, pay-outs are more likely to be driven by non-earnings factors, such as 
signalling that their share is undervalued (Ikenberry et al., 1995), distributing 
transitory cash windfalls (Guay and Harford, 2000; Jagannathan et al. (2000), 
funding acquisitions (Fama and French, 2001), or offsetting the dilutive effects 
(Kahle, 2002). In support of the afore mentioned, Jagannathan et al. (2000) show 
that firms with more volatile cash flows tend to prefer more flexible share 
repurchases over dividends, suggesting that firms use repurchases to distribute 
temporary profits and increase dividends only when they believe earnings have risen 
permanently. From this evidence, it is clear that there seems to be two very strong 
arguments. According to some authors, share repurchases are a predictor of future 
earnings (Van Eaton, 1999). On the other hand, share repurchases come about as a 
result of temporary changes in earnings. The findings of the study at hand indicate 
that share repurchases are a good predictor of earnings  
 
 
4.9. Test for Correlation 
The correlation matrix for share repurchases and changes in earnings indicates that 
there is a strong, positive correlation (0.70719) between share repurchases and 
changes in earnings. This is not surprising as repurchases models by Vermaelen 
(1981), Ofer and Thakor (1987), Grundy (1989), McNally (1999) and others, show 
that a share repurchase event may be a valuable signal to investors about current 
undervaluation and the future prospects of the firm, which should command a higher 
share price. Due to the new information about future earnings, implied by the event, 
a positive price impact on the event day is expected, as price adjusts to the new 
information. From the aforementioned, it can be said that there is asymmetric 
information between the managers and outside investors. Therefore, share 
repurchase events communicate valuable information about current earnings and the 
future prospects of the firm. Bhattacharya (1979), Miller and Rock (1985) and 
Vermaelen (1984) suggest that the repurchase decision can reveal information about 
future earnings and profitability to the market. Nonetheless, Jagannathan et al. 
(2000) raise an interesting argument that share repurchases are more sensitive to a 
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transitory shock in cash flows while cash dividends respond to changes in 
permanent components of earnings. Therefore, the positive correlation between 
share repurchases and changes in earnings, may relate to temporary changes in 
earnings as opposed to permanent changes.  In the findings of the study at hand, 
one cannot say whether the relationship relates to temporary or permanent changes 
in earnings. Further investigation would have to be done in order to establish the true 
nature of changes in earnings.  
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CHAPTER 5 
5. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1. Conclusions 
The objectives of this study were to: determine whether changes in dividends reflect 
past or future earnings change and examine the market‘s reaction to share 
repurchase events in the short-run. Using INET BFA, data for 226 dividend paying 
companies and 55 share repurchasing companies, trading on the JSE during the 
period 2003 to 2013, was collected. Regression equations and graphs adopted from 
the papers written by Auret and Wolffe (2009) and Benartzi et al. (1997), were used 
to test whether dividend changes were useful in predicting earnings changes or not. 
In addition, several event study tests were performed in order to get an 
understanding of how the South African market reacts to share repurchase events. 
Through investigating the market reaction, one was able to establish whether there 
was an announcement effect. This question was answered by examining the AAR 
and CAAR when a share repurchase announcement was made.  
 
 
A Table illustrating changes in earnings in the year of and the years following the 
dividend changes, was constructed. The results showed that a strong positive 
dividend-earnings relationship was present. This meant that, when current dividends 
increased (decreased), current earnings increased (decreased) simultaneously. 
These results were not surprising given that earnings and dividend events are made 
on the same day in South Africa. Nonetheless, the regression analysis did not 
produce any evidence that dividends conveyed information content with respect to 
earnings in years 1 or 2. This was due to the fact that there were instances where 
firms had reduced dividends, yet earnings were positive in the years that followed. In 
addition, earnings were negative for some of the dividend increase firm groups. 
Therefore, no results in favour of signalling were found. These findings corroborate 
those reported by Auret and Wolffe (2009) and Benartzi et al. (1997).  
 
 
As an extension to the investigation, Granger causality tests were also conducted. 
These tests showed that changes in dividends did not Granger cause changes in 
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earnings and changes in earnings did not Granger cause changes in dividends. 
Therefore, there is no causal relationship between these two variables. A feasible 
explanation may be that there were numerous factors that may have caused a firm to 
issue dividend pay-outs. While earnings may have influenced the issuance of 
dividends, they were not the sole contributing factor when making this decision. 
   
 
An interesting observation however, was that made from the correlation matrix. 
Results showed that changes in earnings were positively correlated to changes in 
dividends. Therefore as earnings increased, dividends also increased and vice 
versa. This relationship may have been caused by the fact that dividend and 
earnings announcements occur on the same day, in South Africa. From an 
international perspective Howatt et al. (2009) stated that if a particular firm 
experienced a dividend cut, that firm would later experience a decline in average 
earnings per share. This confirms the results of the correlation matrix. In conclusion 
it can be said that the topic on whether changes in earnings signal changes in 
dividends or vice versa, remains contentious. The study at hand refutes the notion 
that changes in dividend pay-outs signal future changes in earnings. Therefore, 
managers in South Africa do not use dividends to signal future earnings. The study 
does however confirm that earnings changed first, before management decided to 
change dividend pay-outs. Nonetheless, changes in earnings did not Granger cause 
changes in dividend pay-outs. There were other factors (including earnings) that 
managers looked at before changing dividends.  
 
 
The paper written by Fama and French (2001) shows that after controlling for firm 
characteristics firms now have a lower propensity to pay dividends. Several 
explanations have been offered as to the reason(s) for a declining propensity of firms 
to pay dividends. Grullon and Michaely (2002) suggest that there is evidence which 
indicates that share repurchases serve as substitutes for dividends. Some 
arguments hold that improved corporate governance has reduced the need for 
dividends as a mechanism to control the agency problems of free cash flows. One of 
the objectives of the study at hand was to analyse the trend of dividend changes, 
over the past years.  According to the results obtained in the study at hand, dividend 
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changes seemed to follow a negative trend. This indicated that companies were 
either changing their dividends at lower rates or reducing their dividend pay-outs. 
Furthermore, the forecast that dividends will continue to decline could not be 
rejected. This was supported by evidence showing that large companies such as: 
Kumba, Glencore, Sasol and Anglo American had all cut their dividends in the year 
2015. The rationale behind these dividend reductions seems to have been poor 
company performance, which was caused by the sluggish growth of the South 
African economy (Janse van Vuuren, 2015; McDonald and Patterson, 2015; 
Stoddard, 2015; Yeomans, 2015). An additional explanation was that dividend pay-
outs were actually being replaced by share repurchases. Therefore, there were more 
companies that were substituting cash dividends with share repurchases. The study 
conducted by Wesson (2015), showed that the pace at which companies were willing 
to buy back their own shares had increased dramatically over the past few years. 
Investors seemed to have welcomed this, as the share value of the remaining 
shareholders increased.  
 
 
Previous studies have always looked at dividends and share repurchases in 
isolation. Nevertheless, these two methods of distributing cash to shareholders form 
part of pay-out policy. As a result, a lot of value is added to existing literature when 
both dividend pay-out policy and share repurchases are examined in one research 
paper. Following the discussion on the findings obtained on dividend pay-outs, the 
study then went on to investigate the relationship between earnings and share 
repurchase events. A linear regression model was used in testing this. According to 
the results of the model, the coefficient for share repurchases was positive significant 
in predicting changes in earnings. Therefore, share repurchases were a good signal 
of future changes in earnings. The results of the correlation matrix confirmed the 
findings in the aforementioned. There was a strong, positive correlation between 
changes in earnings and share purchases. When firms repurchased their shares, it 
caused a positive change in earnings. Therefore, the results showed that share 
repurchases were a good predictor of changes in earnings. This was particularly 
interesting as most South African studies had not researched the relationship 
between these variables. .  
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In addition to the aforementioned, the study at hand investigated what the market‘s 
reaction was, following a share repurchase. According to the results, daily share 
prices returns followed a declining trend before the share repurchase event.  
However, (6) days prior to the share repurchase event there was a great deal of 
volatility. From (T0) to (T3) the returns increased drastically, indicating that the event 
had taken place. These increases are short lived as the returns decline again 
between (T4) to (T9) and then normalised after this time. Based on the 
aforementioned, it can be said that companies repurchased their shares to signal 
undervaluation to the market. Firms that repurchased their shares often experienced 
share price declines before this event took place. The market therefore, perceived 
share repurchases positively as share price returns started to increase after the 
shares were repurchased. These findings were not surprising as they are in line with 
results obtained by Chan et al. (2010). Their study showed that management  
repurchased shares for reasons such as: signalling to the market that the shares are 
undervalued, distributing cash to shareholders, warding off potential takeover 
raiders, distributing excess cash when there are no profitable investment 
opportunities, adjusting financial leverage and avoiding dilution. However, signalling 
stood as the biggest motivator for repurchasing shares. In addition to the above 
mentioned, the research conducted by Dhanani and Roberts (2009) showed that 
investors generally perceived share repurchase programmes as having a positive 
impact on the share price, hence the share price return increase. From a South 
African perspective, results of a similar nature were obtained by Wesson et al. 
(2014) 
 
 
The scope of the investigation on the market‘s reaction to share repurchases was 
broadened when tests on: abnormal share returns (which are the firm‘s returns after 
subtracting returns attributable to overall movements of the share market), average 
abnormal returns (which are the returns averaged across all firms) and cumulative 
average abnormal returns (which is the sum of average abnormal returns) were 
conducted. The findings showed that pre-event abnormal returns were negative and 
significant at a 95-percent level. Positive abnormal returns can be witnessed at (T4) 
and (T7), post the share repurchase event. Nonetheless, these positive returns were 
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short lived as returns moved back to negative territory, a few days after the event. 
According to Bukalska (2014), results of this nature suggested the presence of the 
‗event effect‘: which is the impact that certain information can have on financial 
markets. It can therefore be concluded that managers use share repurchases as an 
instrument for stabilising a company‘s share price, which is undervalued at the time 
and has been following a downward trend for many consecutive days. A significant 
event (such as a share repurchase event) has the potential of altering the patterns of 
share returns of a firm or industry. In this case the share repurchase event was taken 
as good news, that is, investors believed that the event signified a bright future this 
led to an increase in the share price.  
 
 
The results relating to average abnormal returns were fairly similar to the above 
mentioned. Returns started off in negative territory, prior to the share repurchase. 
Once the shares have been repurchased, the market reacted positively and returns 
increased at (T4) and (T7). These findings reiterated the notion that managers 
repurchased shares when a firm‘s share price had been experiencing consistent 
declines. Nonetheless, what was interesting was that returns were negative for at 
least three days after the share repurchase event. Under the assumption of efficient 
markets, the market‘s investors should have discounted the new information that the 
event gives and the share price should adjust immediately. Chan et al. (2007) stated 
that if, investors could not ex-ante sort through potentially misleading behaviour, an 
under reaction (in terms of returns) would be experienced following a share 
repurchase event. The market would however correct this under reaction over time 
as additional information arrives, resulting in positive information shocks. Another 
explanation could be that, prior to the share repurchase event share prices had been 
falling anyway. The event causes an uptick in the share prices, thus leading to a 
gradual increase in share returns. The results of the average abnormal returns did 
however indicate that once the hype around the share buyback had stopped, share 
price returns moved back to the negative region. A possible explanation for the long-
drawn-out period of mispricing was that a share is perceived as a long term asset 
therefore, mispricing can persist for extended periods. In the study carried out by 
Wesson et al. (2014), a longer event window was observed. According to the results 
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of that paper, the full impact of the share repurchase event can extend over several 
years.  
 
 
Interestingly, the test on cumulative average abnormal returns showed slightly 
different results. According to these findings, share returns were negative and close 
to zero, before the event date (T0). However instead of an increase in returns, post 
the share repurchase event, there was a continuation of negative cumulative 
average abnormal returns. According to Manconi et al. (2014), total average 
cumulative abnormal returns should be positive post the share repurchase event. 
This was not the case in the study at hand and similar results were obtained in the 
South African study conducted by Wesson et al. (2014). Their results showed that 
cumulative average abnormal returns remained marginally below zero before the 
share repurchase. In the days surrounding the event, (T-3) to (T3), a small increase 
was observed, however in the period following the event, from (T10) to (T22), the 
cumulative average abnormal returns declined. Since their study observed a longer 
period, cumulative average abnormal returns steadily increase from (T50). Had the 
study at hand examined a longer period, a comparison could have been done 
between the two studies.  
 
 
In conclusion, it can be said that the market reacted positively to share repurchase 
events, even though the effect of the event may take a long time before the benefits 
are fully realised. Furthermore, share repurchases are a good predictor of changes 
in earnings. 
 
 
5.2.  Recommendations 
The study at hand indicated that, changes in dividends do not granger cause 
changes in earnings. In addition, changes in earnings do not granger cause changes 
in earnings. Therefore dividends are not able to predict changes in earnings. This is 
an extremely important point to note for investors that only want to invest in 
companies that issue dividends or investors that sell their shareholdings in 
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companies that cut dividends. A dividend cut is not an indication that a company‘s 
earnings will decrease in the future.  
 
 
Managers of JSE listed companies should not only focus on the short-term benefits 
of share repurchase events. These benefits are generally short lived as shares do 
return to their falling state, however authors such as Wesson et al. (2014) have 
shown that the benefits of share repurchase events can also be observed in the 
long- run.  In their study, shares showed immense positive returns in the long-run   
 
 
A further point to note for both investors and managers of JSE listed companies is 
that share repurchases are a good predictor of future earnings. Therefore, it is very 
confusing for investors when a company announces a share repurchase event but 
does not follow through with it. In addition, shareholders should not place dividend 
pay-outs above share repurchase events, especially because share repurchases are 
a good predictor of future changes in earnings. 
 
 
More research is however needed to understand even the basic elements of the 
corporate financial ‗eco-system‘, which include financing, investment, and pay-out 
policies. Moreover, there seems to be a lack in the availability of South African 
literature that investigates the effects of share repurchases and dividend pay-outs on 
shareholder wealth. In particular, future studies should look at share repurchases 
changes, their determinants and effect on earnings changes. This investigation 
should extend over several years as significant results may only be seen after many 
years. 
 
 
During the sample period of the study at hand, there were more firms that were 
issuing dividends than those that were repurchasing shares. It would be very useful 
to investigate whether: there are still more firms that are issuing dividend pay-outs, 
relative to those repurchasing shares or are dividends disappearing. If there is a 
decline in the propensity to pay-out dividends, what are the drivers behind this 
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decline and the increase in share repurchases (from a South African perspective). 
With regard to those managers that continuously pay-out dividends, it would be 
interesting to establish why managers continue to pay-out dividends when they are 
costly, yet the market reacts positively to share repurchase events. In the paper 
written by Wesson (2015) it was mentioned that open market repurchases need to 
be reported by the company via the Securities Exchange News Service (SENS) of 
the Johannesburg Securities Exchange once it has cumulatively acquired (3%) of its 
initial number of issued shares (of that class, as at the date of the resolution) and on 
each (3%) thereafter. Companies repurchasing less than the cumulative (3%) 
therefore need not announce their open market share repurchases. The (3%) rule 
however seems to be interpreted as (3%) cumulatively per annum by many 
companies. While the official stance of the JSE is that the (3%) disclosure 
requirement is not limited to a specific year, it appears that JSE sponsors advise 
their clients that the (3%) threshold runs from one annual general meeting, at which 
shareholders provide the necessary authorisation, to the next (Wesson, 2015). The 
(3%) event rule on open market share repurchases therefore results in significant 
understatement of actual open market share repurchase activities. In fact Bester et 
al. (2010) show that open market repurchases represent about (61%) of total share 
repurchases in value and only (49%) of open market repurchases in value are 
announced via SENS. Future research needs to investigate whether there is a better 
system  of capturing the total number of open  market share repurchases that take 
place in South Africa. This would ensure that the correct data is correct and 
comparable to international studies. It would also be ground breaking research as 
this method could be utilised by the JSE. 
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